中國大陸對賭協議法律效力之認定

對賭協議作為投融資雙方基於融資企業估值的未來不確定性而採用的動態定價機制，是中國大陸私募股權投資中常見的契約條款。簽訂對賭協議的投融資雙方通過設定業績、上市等對賭目標，然後視目標能否實現對企業估值進行調整。此調整功能一方面可以消弭雙方對企業價值被高估或低估的顧慮，另一方面可以激勵融資方審慎經營以實現對賭目標。此外，基於私募股權投資的財務投資屬性，投資方雖然投入大量資金，但並不欲參與企業日常經營，僅在極少數涉及企業分立、合併等重大事項中參與投票，所以融資方既可以獲得企業發展的資金支持，又可以繼續保有企業控制權。正因如此，對賭協議這一創新金融工具迅速席捲中國大陸資本市場，其與優先股、可轉換公司債等兼具債權與股權特徵的混合型融資工具配合使用，廣泛運用於私募股權投資領域。然而，對賭協議內含的估值調整機制在現行法律體系中易滋生法律風險，尤其在被稱為「對賭第一案」的蘇州海富案再審後，司法實務中形成了不成文的「規則」——與公司對賭無效，與股東對賭有效，對此說法，學界及實務界一直爭議不斷，本文認為，這一判決規則過於武斷，並非不可打破，判斷對賭協議有效與否，需要更為深入的研究及詳盡的論證。本文以對賭協議為研究對象，從理論及實踐理解對賭協議並準確判斷其法律屬性是研究其法律效力的基礎，因此，本文首先從理論上分析中國大陸私募股權投資的背景、對賭協議的概念、類型、形成原因及法律性質；其次，從對賭協議的操作模式、常用條款和配合使用的投資工具等方面介紹中國大陸對賭協議的使用現狀；然後，整理司法及仲裁實務中的法律效力認定情況，結合上述理論及實踐需求，從契約法和公司法兩個角度分析現行法律制度中不同類型對賭協議的法律效力；最後，本文借鑒美國實踐之啟示，結合中國大陸目前的法律環境，探討如何在現行法律體系下打破融資企業參與的對賭協議效力之困境。

關鍵字

對賭協議；私募股權投資；法律效力；公司法；債權人保護

並列摘要

As a valuation adjustment mechanism, the VAM agreement (also called gambling agreement) is adopted by both financier and investor in fear of the future uncertainty in the evaluating of financing companies, it is commonly used as contractual clause in private equity investment in mainland China. The investing and financing parties who signed the VAM agreement will previously set targets such as to achieve certain company performance, to be listed, and then they could adjust the valuation of the company depending on whether the target can be achieved. This corrector mechanism can on the one hand eliminate the concerns of both parties that the value of the enterprise is overvalued or undervalued, and on the other hand, it can encourage the financing party to operate prudently in order to achieve the goal that has been set. In addition, based on its financial investment nature of private equity investment, although the investors invest a lot of money, they do not want to participate in the daily operations of the company. They participate only in few votes in which essential issues as separation and merger of enterprise are involved, therefore the financing party can obtain financial support for development of the enterprise and at the same time maintain the control of the enterprise. As such, in combination with preferred stocks, convertible bond and other hybrid financing instruments with characteristics of both obligations and equity, this innovative financial instrument of VAM agreement has become widely used in the field of private equity investment on the capital market of mainland China. However, the inherent valuation adjustment mechanism in the VAM agreement is prone to legal risks in the current legal system, especially when an unwritten rule has been formed in judicial practice after the re-trial judgment of the Suzhou Haifu case, which is called the “first case of VAM”: the court judged the VAM agreement ineffective with regard to the company, but effective with regard to the shareholder. Nevertheless, this question has been controversial in the practice and in academia. The author believes that this judgment is too arbitrary to be unbreakable, and the effectiveness of VAM agreement requires in-depth research and detailed argumentation. This paper takes the VAM agreement as the object of research. Firstly, it analyzes from a theoretical perspective the background of private equity investment in mainland China, the concept, type, cause of formation and legal nature of VAM agreement, since the accurate judgment of legal nature is fundamental to the study of its legal effect. Secondly, the paper will introduce the status quo of VAM agreement in mainland China from the aspects of the operation mode, frequently-used terms and other investment tools in combination with the VAM agreement; then, by sorting out the verdict on the legal effect of VAM agreement in judicial and arbitral practice and by balancing the divers theories and the needs in practice, the paper will analyze the legal effect of different types of VAM agreement in the current legal system from the perspective of contract law and corporate law. Finally, this paper draws on the enlightenment of American practice and combines the current judicial environment in mainland China to find out which is the judicial path it should follow in the judgment of the effectiveness of VAM agreement.