公民投票制度存在必要性之研究

欲論證公民投票制度存在之必要性，為了避免社會科學研究上必然遭遇的難題，即因人而異的價值判斷。本文嘗試以法規政策影響分析模式(regulatory impact analysis，簡稱RIA)中的成本效益分析(cost-benefit analysis，簡稱CBA)，利用淨效益現值法（NPV法）、益本比法（B／C 法）、內在報酬率法（internal rate of return，IRR法）作為論證工具。當NPV > 0，表示有潛在 Pareto改善，亦即經由 Kaldor-Hicks補償原則表示的淨效益現值和為正，法規、政策或公共投資值得採行（NPV愈大愈值得採行）；當NPV < 0，表示有損社會福利，法規、政策或公共投資，不值得採行；當B/C＞1時，法規、政策或公共投資值得採行；當內在報酬率（λ）大於社會貼現率（r）時，法規、政策或公共投資亦值得採行；併借用Riker and Ordeshook知名的「投票計算公式」(the calculus of voting) R＝BP－C＋D。思考公民投票制度實施的「R值」為何（就該公投案付諸公投之後的報酬效益）；B值為何（利益落差為何，亦即個人偏好的議題與其厭惡議題通過的兩者間利益之落差）；P值為何（帶來此利益落差的機率）；C值為何（就該議案實施公投個人所費之成本）；D值為何（公民責任、公民效用感）。藉此探尋公投制度中BP值、C值以及D值的所在。亦即，當R值大於零，將該案付諸公投是理性的；若R值小於零，將該案付諸公投是不理性的。而若假設能就每一公投案的R值為統計，當R值平均大於零時，則台灣繼續推動公投制度是理性的；當R值平均小於零時，則台灣繼續推動公投制度是不理性的。本文以文獻回顧夾敘夾議的方式，呈現關於公投制度的正反立論，再以問卷方式，採願付價值法，詢問公民「對於建立公投制度您願意付多少錢？」更深地思考台灣是否要繼續推動公投；併認為監察院可作為中央獨立的法規政策影響評估機構，以RIA模式評估全國法令的立法必要性。最後，透過數學運算得出本文所設計之公投陪審團制度是當代民主形式中，最低成本、最高效益、最小侵害、最有必要採取的手段。

關鍵字

公民投票；公投陪審團；必要性； RIA ； CBA ；淨效益現值法(NPV) ； R＝BP－C＋D ； I＝CR／B ；多數暴力；代議制度失靈

並列摘要

In order to avoid the dilemma that must be encountered in social science research which is value judgements shall vary from person to person while demonstrating the necessity of the referendum system, this study attempts to use the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in the regulatory impact analysis (RIA), the net present value method (NPV), the Benefit-Cost ratio, (BCR), and internal rate of return (IRR) as the test tools. When NPV > 0, there is a potential Pareto improvement. This study attempts to use the cost-benefit analysis (CBA)in the regulatory impact analysis (RIA), the net present value method (NPV) , the Benefit-Cost ratio, (BCR), and internal rate of return(IRR)as the test tools. When NPV > 0, it indicates that there is potential Pareto improvement, which means the present value of the net benefit expressed by the Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle is positive, and it shows that regulations, policies or public investments are worth being taken.(Briefly, the larger the NPV is, the more worthwhile it is); on the other hand, when NPV < 0, it shows that it is detrimental to social welfare, regulations, policies or public investment, are not worth being taken; when B/C>1, regulations, policies or public investment are worthwhile; when the internal rate of return (λ) is greater than the social discount rate (r), the rules, policies, or public investments are worthwhile; this study also makes use of Riker and Ordeshook's well-known “calculus of voting” R=BP-C+D. Through this research, we are allowed to understand what the "R value" of the implementation of the referendum system (the reward effect after the referendum proposal is put into practice) is; moreover, this study provides with a chance to analyze what B value (whether the difference in interest, that is, the difference between the individual's preference and the risk of passing the disgusting issue), P value (the probability of bringing this interest gap), C value (the cost of implementing a referendum on a single individual) , and D value (citizen duty , citizen efficacy) are. In this way, we are able to find the BP value, C value and D value in the referendum system. First, when the R value is greater than zero, it is reasonable to put the proposal into the referendum; if the R value is less than zero, it is unreasonable to put the proposal into the referendum. Second, if it is assumed that the R value of each referendum can be counted, when the R value is greater than zero, it is rational for Taiwan to continue to promote the referendum system; when the R value is less than zero, it is irrational for Taiwan to continue to promote the referendum system. This study presents positive and negative arguments about the referendum system via literature review. Then, through the questionnaire, we utilize the WTP method to ask the public "How much are you willing to pay for the establishment of the referendum system?" Furthermore, we discuss whether Taiwan should keep promoting the referendum. It is believed that the Control Yuan could be set up as an independent RIA agency from the central government system to assess the necessity of national regulations. Finally, through mathematical calculations, the referendum jury system designed in this study appears to be the most beneficial method with the lowest cost, the least violation, and the most necessity.

並列關鍵字

Referendum ； Referendum Jury ； Necessity ； RIA ； CBA ； NPV ； R=BP-C+D ； I=CR/B ； Majority tyranny ； Representative democracy failure

參考文獻

第一節西文文獻

Google Scholar

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