土耳其共和國之三重避險政策： 以艾爾多安總統時期為例（2014-2023）

本文以個案研究法與文獻分析法為研究方法，探討土耳其於總統制之下的外交政策發展，以艾爾多安2014年成為總統開始至2023年為時間框架探討土耳其所面對到的北約以及俄羅斯強權，進而發展出的三重避險政策模型。本文以Alim與Wilkins學者的理論與避險模型作出發，透過土耳其的案例去豐富三重避險模型的理論意涵。土耳其的三重避險模型之中；第一重避險之下，艾爾多安總統領導下的土耳其朝向偏離西方的方向發展，卻有所限制。由於土國與歐盟的關稅同盟讓雙邊經濟無法脫鉤，其次，土國的經濟危機與俄烏戰爭使艾爾多安政府必須重視與北約的關係，土國所欲發展的軍備自主政策也受制於美國的影響，這些因素都促使著土北約的關係仍然重要，且有著回暖的趨勢。第二重避險之下，能源與國家利益的擴張是土俄關係呈現競合的主要原因。也由於雙邊建築於利益之上的合作與北約和俄羅斯的對抗使得土俄仍然是「亦敵亦友」的關係。土耳其的主要發展仍然是以自主作為主要脈絡，然而在成為區域強權以前，需要借助與俄羅斯的競合來達成。第三重避險之下，複雜區域網絡的實踐包含了領導人式外交、相互貿易投資的重視以及無人機外交的實行。艾爾多安政府透過自身於伊斯蘭合作組織（OIC）之中的重要貿易地位，發展複合式合作模型與土耳其共識。在突厥國家組織（OTS）之中，則是以運輸、天然氣合作來拉攏區域的國家。於兩組織之中，土耳其也藉由無人機的輸出來擴大自身於地緣政治之上的影響力。土耳其的三重避險模型因此以維持北約關係、維持與俄羅斯的能源合作與加深區域國家的連結作為其主要的意涵。

關鍵字

土耳其；三重避險模型；北約；俄羅斯； OIC ； OTS ；無人機外交

並列摘要

This article focuses on the development of Türkiye's foreign policy under the presidential system, from President Erdoğan's assumption of office in 2014 until 2023. It explores Turkey's encounters with the NATO and Russian hegemony, leading to the development of a three-way hedging policy model. The study utilizes the theoretical framework and hedging model proposed by scholars Alim and Wilkins, enriching the theoretical implications of the triple hedging model through the case of Türkiye. In the first layer of hedging, under the leadership of President Erdoğan, Türkiye has been moving towards a deviation from the West, but with limitations. The Customs Union between Türkiye and the European Union prevents bilateral economic disengagement. Furthermore, Türkiye's economic crisis and the Ukraine war have compelled the Erdoğan government to prioritize its relationship with NATO. Additionally, Türkiye's aspirations for an independent defense policy are constrained by American influence, making its relationship with NATO still significant and showing signs of improvement. In the second layer of hedging, the expansion of energy resources and national interests is the main reason for the competitive-cooperative nature of the Türkiye-Russia relationship. The cooperation built upon interests, alongside the confrontation between NATO and Russia, maintains Türkiye-Russia relations as a "frenemy" dynamic. Türkiye's primary development still revolves around autonomy as the main context. However, before becoming a regional power, it needs to rely on maintaining the competitive-cooperative relationship with Russia to achieve its goals. In the third layer of hedging, the practice of a complex regional network includes leader-centric diplomacy, emphasis on mutual trade and investment, and the implementation of drone diplomacy. The Erdoğan government, through Türkiye's significant trading position within the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), develops a composite cooperation model and consensus within Türkiye. Within the Turkic States Organization (OTS), Türkiye uses transportation and natural gas cooperation to attract regional countries. In both organizations, Türkiye also expands its geopolitical influence through the export of drones. Therefore, Türkiye's three-way hedging policy model focuses on maintaining its relationship with NATO, sustaining energy cooperation with Russia, and deepening connections with regional countries as its primary implications.