不對稱資訊之管制對律師市場的影響

Regulation under Asymmetric Information: A Model of Lawyer Market

黃于真(Yu-Chen Huang)

指導教授 ： 莊委桐

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/經濟學研究所/碩士(2013年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2013.10158

摘要

多年來台灣各界對是否藉由放鬆律師資格考試管制，以進一步達成刺激市場競爭之可能性有著許多正反兩面不同的意見。贊成嚴格管制者認為在資訊不對稱的情況下，市場應透過管制降低消費者所面臨的不確定性，進而解決市場失靈問題（參考public interest theory, Akerlof 1970, Arrow 1971, Leland 1979）。而支持放鬆管制者多以為管制往往流於產業的既得利益者製造市場障礙的手段，政府管制會減少市場競爭並降低效率（參考capture theory, Adam Smith 1776, Stigler 1971）。不過雙方對於適度管制存在的必要性仍有共識，但「適度管制」的程度為何才是雙方意見分歧的關鍵。
本文提出了一理論模型分析管制如何對律師市場發生影響。我們嘗試解釋並比較不同程度的管制在均衡時對律師工作數量、品質、報酬以及消費者剩餘的影響。我們發現在較鬆的管制標準下，市場上個別律師將減少工作量且部分律師將提高服務品質。而律師的工作總量將上升。在某些條件成立時，放鬆管制將對消費者與律師都有利。
經濟學研究經常對管制是否可以透過下放或交由市場機制替代感到興趣。本文中我們也加入大型律師事務所在不對稱資訊下可能扮演的角色。美國的前十大律師事務所的律師人數平均超過2000名，相較之下台灣最大的律師事務所律師人數尚不足150名。如果大型律師事務所可以透過建立名聲降低消費者所面臨的不確定性及搜尋成本的話，管制的部分功能也許能由事務所的品牌經營所替代。我們也透過模型對此一可能性做出探討。

關鍵字

不對稱資訊 ； 政府管制 ； 律師市場 ； 混合均衡 ； 大型律師事務所

並列摘要

Over the last few decades, there has been a huge debate on the need of government regulation on the legal market in Taiwan for the last few decades. The supporting side argues that the goal of regulation is to protect the public and reducing the uncertainty, while the opposing side claims that the objective of regulation is to limit competition and to make the market outcome socially wasteful.
This paper presents a new model of lawyer market under asymmetric information, where consumers observe the quantity rather than quality of the lawyers' work. In our model, the government sets the rules to govern the legal market and to limit the number of lawyers in the market through entry and conduct regulation. There are several pros and cons to impose an entry regulation in the legal market. We find that limited liberalization may induce a lower workload of individual lawyers, and probably induce a higher quality of services and a higher level of the consumers’ surplus if barriers to entry are high for the most talented potential lawyers.
The second part of our research examines the role of large law firms in the legal market. Our paper employs a simple model of a large law firm which provides a discernible legal service quality. We study the equilibrium results and find the lawyers in the law firm should work less than the self-employed lawyers.

並列關鍵字

asymmetric information ； government regulation ； lawyer market ； pooling equilibrium ； large law firms

參考文獻

15.黃旭田，2000年8月，"律師大量增加對律師職業及台北律師公會之影響"，律師雜誌第251期，90-99。

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