審計品質對多角化之重要性?

Does Auditor Quality Matter for Diversification?

劉志諒(Chih-Liang Liu)

指導教授 ： 王泰昌

共同指導教授 ： 陳聖賢(Sheng-Syan Chen)

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/會計學研究所/博士(2007年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2007.10045

摘要

Montgomery　(1994) 研究報導中指出美國前五百大公開上市公司中有三分之二的企業從事異業多角化經營，這些公司的資產總額佔所有上市公司總資產的三分之二且提供二分之一的美國就業市場。此外，美國財務會計準則委員會於1997年發佈財務會計準則131號公報，此公報主要目的為增進多部門公司資訊的揭露程度。因此，多角化公司不僅在美國經濟上扮演著舉足輕重的角色，而且在會計上亦是受重視的課題。
本研究首先探討審計品質(會計師事務所的規模與會計師產業專家)與多角化之超額價值間的關連性。研究結果發現多角化公司更可能僱用規模大的會計師事務所或在產業上專精的會計師事務所來證實其財務報導及資訊揭露的可靠性，此關係在統計檢定上是非常顯著，更能呼應審計在資本市場上所扮演的監督與治理角色。整體而言，審計品質對資本市場是非常重要，尤其其所提供有價值資訊給投資者。
此外，此篇研究也從代理理論的觀點來探究是否審計品質能提升多角化公司的投資有效性問題。假如審計品質能透過降低以下兩種代理問題，將能促使多角化公司從事更有效率之投資。一、若會計師能提供更可靠的資訊來幫助外部投資者監督經理人的投資行為，將能約束經理人從事更有效率的投資。二、若會計師能提供有關部門間資本移轉資訊給經理人資金分配決策參考，將能促使其從事更有效率的部門投資。研究結果發現審計品質能提供多角化公司部門之投資有效性及更有效率之部門間資金分配，此結果不受會計師選擇的內生性、不同的審計品質變數衡量、投資變數衡量與不同的控制變數所影響。

關鍵字

多角化 ； 多角化折扣 ； 審計品質 ； 投資效率性 ； 代理問題

並列摘要

Montgomery (1994) reports that two-thirds of the Fortune 500 U.S. public companies were remarkably diversified and involved in more than one industry. These firms accounted for nearly 50% of U.S. employment and owned about 60% of the total assets of publicly traded firms (Martin and Sayrak, 2003). Also, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in June 1997 issued SFAS No. 131, which was enacted to improve information disclosure about the diversity of a diversified firm’s operations. Thus, diversified firms constitute a significant portion of the U.S. economy and important sector for accountants.
First, this study examines the relation between the auditor quality (auditor size and auditor industry specialization) and the excess value attributed to diversification. Consistent with the hypothesis that monitoring and governance of audit are important to the capital markets, we find that (1) diversified firms are more likely to employ a Big N auditor or an industry-specialist auditor to signal the credibility of financial statement information for enhanced disclosures, (2) the relation between auditor quality and the excess value is most pronounced in diversified firms, and (3) the information role of audits is statistically significant to the stock market. Overall, our results suggest that, through their roles of producing valuable information to the investors, auditor quality matter to capital market participants.
Second, we investigate how auditor quality relates to the investment efficiency in the diversified firms suffering from sever agency problems. We hypothesize that auditor quality can enhance investment efficiency in the diversification by reducing information asymmetry in two ways: First, an auditor can provide greater credibility information to shareholders, thereby helping them monitor managers’ actions, improving investment efficiencies. Second, auditors can improve the efficient allocation of capital across business segment, thereby removing information asymmetries between division managers and headquarters in internal capital markets. Our results are consistent with these hypotheses, suggesting that auditor quality can provide a monitoring mechanism on enhancing investment efficiency across segment and efficient allocation in internal capital. They are robust to correct for self-selection of auditor choice, different measures of auditor quality, alternative investment measures, and numerous control variables.

並列關鍵字

Diversification ； Diversification discount ； Audit quality ； Investment efficiency ； Agency problem

參考文獻

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