經理人是否會給予寬鬆的信用政策以避免報導損失？

Do Managers Give Extended Credit to Avoid Reporting Losses ?

王蘭芬(Lan-Fen Wang)

指導教授 ： 董水量

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/會計學研究所/碩士(2005年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2005.00241

摘要

類似Jackson和Wilcox (2000)的研究，這篇論文將檢視經理人是否會在期末給予較寬鬆的信用政策，誘使下游配銷商客戶超額購買，進而達到避免報導損失的目的。進一步地，再觀察這樣的盈餘管理方式，是否會使得盈餘的資訊性降低，而未預期的應收帳款科目在這樣的情形下，能否提供額外的資訊給報表使用者。
由實證的結果發現，公司經理人是有可能為達到年度財務報導目標，而在年底給予較寬鬆的信用條件。這樣的盈餘操縱手法，會傷害到盈餘的資訊性，降低市場報酬率和盈餘的關連性。最後，這篇論文的結果亦顯示出，未預期的應收帳款科目在這樣的情形下，是可以傳達額外的資訊給報表使用者。這些實證結果都和原先的預期相符。

關鍵字

盈餘管理 ； 避免報導損失 ； 塞貨 ； 裁量性應計項目

並列摘要

Similar to Jackson and Wilcox (2000), this study investigates whether managers give extended credit terms at the end of year to accelerate distributors purchases and, as a result, avoid reporting losses. This study also investigate whether this kind of earnings management affects the informativeness of earnings, and whether a relatively reliable measure of management’s exercise of channel stuffing over earnings--unexpected accounts receivable (UAR)--can provide incremental information under this phenomenon.
Consistent with expectations, I find that firm managers are likely to grant extended credit terms at the end of year to meet annual financial reporting target, and this kind of manipulation reduces the association between returns and earnings. Finally, my results also show that under this phenomenon, UAR can provide incremental information.

並列關鍵字

Earnings management ； Avoiding reporting losses ； channel stuffing ； Discretionary accruals

參考文獻

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