本研究以2004年至2013年間美國一般產業為樣本,將樣本區分為使用衍生工具的企業和未使用衍生工具的企業,探討財務會計準則公報第161號之實施與銀行貸款資金成本(Cost of debt)之關聯性。本研究探討財務會計準則公報第161號之實施是否會提升企業財務報表的資訊透明度進而降低企業銀行貸款的資金成本。研究結果發現使用衍生工具的企業在財務會計準則公報第161號之實施後,相比於未使用衍生工具的企業,負債資金成本會下降,顯示財務會計準則公報第161號之實施有助於企業財務報表資訊透明度的提升。然而,研究結果亦發現當企業雇用的管理者過度自信而導致較差的財務報導品質時,將削弱因財務會計準則公報第161號提升資訊透明度所帶來的資金成本下降影響。
Using the sample of bank loan contracts of U.S. non-financial and non-utilities publicly traded companies over years 2004-2013, this study examines the impact of the SFAS No. 161 adoption on the cost of bank loans of derivatives users. I find that, relative to non-users, the cost of debt as measured by all-in-drawn-spread, the use of the collateral, and the use of the financial covenants is reduced after the adoption of SFAS No. 161. The results suggest that SFAS No. 161 has improved the financial reporting transparency, leading to the reduction in the cost of debt. However, the reduction in the cost of debt is attenuated when derivatives users hire CEOs with overconfidence. This result suggests that managerial overconfidence is associated with poor financial reporting quality; hence, the effect of enhanced transparency ascribing to SFAS No. 161 on the cost of debt for derivatives users is decreased.