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  • 學位論文

經理人調節焦點與會計保守性

CEO Regulatory Focus and Accounting Conservatism

指導教授 : 許文馨
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摘要


過去文獻致力於經理人特質及公司政策及策略之關聯,卻較少以會計政策作為研究方向。本研究以心理學角度,以調節焦點理論(Regulatory Focus) 將經理人特質分為促進型目標定向(Promotion Focus) 和防禦型目標定向(Prevention Focus),探討經理人之特質是否會影響經理人採取保守會計,意即防禦型目標定向之經理人是否較促進型目標定向之經理人認列壞消息的速度會比認列好消息速度快。本文以調節焦點理論之目標定向作為代理變數,並以Basu (1997) 和 C_Score (Khan and Watts, 2009) 作為衡量會計保守之方式。本研究發現經理人之防禦型目標定向與會計保守性呈現正相關,顯示經理人之防禦型目標定向將會使其企業於發布壞消息時較好消息迅速。

並列摘要


Motivated by prior studies that examine the effect of managerial attributes on corporate policies and strategies, this study examines the relation between CEOs’ regulatory focus and accounting conservatism. According to regulatory focus theory (Crowe and Higgins, 1997), people with promotion focus tend to be riskier to seek for achievement, whereas people with prevention focus are more conservative to avoid mistakes. I measure accounting conservatism using Basu’s (1997) model and C_Score (Khan and Watts, 2009) and examine whether CEOs with promotion focus are more conservative than CEOs with prevention focus. I find that CEO’s prevention focus is positively associated with accounting conservatism, suggesting that CEOs with prevention focus is more risk-averse and have higher tendency to be conservative than the other CEOs.

參考文獻


Ahmed, A. S., B. K. Billing, R. M. Morton, M. Stanford-Harris. 2002. The role of accounting conservatism in mitigating bondholders and shareholders conflict over dividend policy and in reducing debt cost. The Accounting Review 77, 867-890
Ahmed, A.S., S. Duellman. 2007. Accounting conservatism and board of director characteristics: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 43, 411-437
Ahmed, A. S., S. Duellman. 2013. Managerial overconfidence and accounting conservatism. Journal of Accounting Research 51, 1-30
Asquith, P., A. Beatty, J. Weber. 2005. Performance pricing in bank debt contracts. Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 40, 101-128
Bagnoli, M., H, Liu and S. G. Watts. 2007. Family Firms, Debtholder-Shareholder Agency Costs and the Use of Covenants in Private Debt. Working Paper. Purdue University

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