台灣上市櫃公司董監改選事件對股價影響之實證研究

The Impact of Board Re-election on Stock Price -An Empirical Analysis of TAIEX-Listed Companies

許雅婷(Ya-Ting Hsu)

指導教授 ： 邱顯比

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/財務金融學研究所/碩士(2014年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2014.10196

摘要

本研究旨為探討台灣上市櫃公司董監改選事件對股價的影響。以事件研究法進行實證研究，取2011~2013年年間，台灣上市櫃共1,100家公司做為研究對象。

實證結果顯示：
(1)發生董監改選公司在董監改選當年最後過戶日前的45個交易日之累積平均異常報酬有顯著正報酬；而在最後過戶日後的45個交易日無顯著的累積平均異常報酬。
(2)公司規模、董監持股多寡、最終控制者擁有的控制權多寡、最終控制者擁有的控制席次百分比、公司控制型態、股權結構是交叉持股與否和外資持股率都會影響在最後過戶日前45個交易日之累積平均異常報酬。
(3)公司規模、控制席次百分比和外資持股率與事件前期的累積平均異常報酬呈負向關係。

關鍵字

董監改選 ； 事件研究法 ； 股權結構

並列摘要

The main purpose of this research is to investigate the relationship between re-election of board members and the company stock price. This report uses event study methodology to analyze the share price of 1,100 companies from 2011~2013.

The empirical research shows the following:
(1)The stock price has a positive cumulative abnormal return between 45 transaction days before the last registration date of the re-election of board.
(2)Company’s size, director stock ownership, the companies’ control right, the percentage of director seats held by the ultimate control, whether there is interlocking shareholding or not, and the percentage of shares held by foreign investors have impacts on the cumulative abnormal return.
(3)Positive cumulative abnormal return on share prices are negative related to the size of the company, percentage of director seats held by the ultimate control and the percentage of shares held by foreign investors.

並列關鍵字

Re-election of board ； Event study ； Ownership Structure

參考文獻

林兆文，2013，台灣上市櫃金融機構董監事改選對股東財富影響之研究，國立臺灣大學社會科學院經濟學系碩士論文。

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