- 學位論文
賽局理論應用於民間參與公共建設專案招商誘因與利潤分配分析之研究
An Analysis Using Game Theory on the Investment Incentive and Profit Allocation of PPP Projects
摘要
根據臺灣經濟研究院之研究，國內PPP(Public Private Partnership)案件每100億資本形成，可以創造約0.08％之經濟成長率。財政部104年2月專案報告則指出，歷年已簽約PPP於103年之實際投入經費約306億，創造約0.24％之經濟成長率，故近年來政府大力推動PPP，並以每年吸引民間1000億的投入資金為目標。雖然PPP案件在國內已是重要一環的產業，但推動至今衍生不少爭議，尤以權利金之爭議為甚。 本研究結合賽局理論(Game Theory)與EVA理論（Economic Value Added），提出招商誘因與利潤分配二種賽局模型，由政府與廠商對同一件PPP專案創造超額利潤能力的差異組成分配率，再透過賽局均衡解的概念建立分析準則，並透過模擬案例與實際案例演練驗證，探討PPP招商誘因與利潤分配之均衡條件與結果。 招商誘因賽局提供政府與廠商在招商之前，評估政府所擬訂的權利金底價是否具備招商誘因，本研究提出固定分配與變動分配二種模式進行探討。在固定分配模式下，政府依投入資本比或法令限制所訂定之權利金底價，必需小於依創造超額利潤-能力比及廠商預估超額利潤所分配之合理利潤，方具有招商誘因。當政府提供土地價值高於廠商投入資本，以變動分配模式設定之權利金策略則難有招商誘因。 利潤分配賽局則提供政府與廠商於PPP甄選或議約階段，藉由先期計畫書與投資計畫書超額利潤，決定均衡的策略與分配利潤。本研究整合政府與廠商實務上常採行之策略，提出廠商理性參與、得標優先與利潤優先三種模式進行探討。研究結果顯示，當政府與廠商創造超額利潤的能力相近時，理性參與的廠商將採誠實策略，雙方各分配一半的超額利潤。當欺騙策略為均衡策略時，廠商應在政府可接受範圍內儘量擴大投資計畫書與實際預估超額利潤的差距，以增加得標機率或最大利益。
並列摘要
According to the research of Taiwan Institute of Economic Research, the domestic PPP (Public Private Partnership) projects create economic growth rate of about 0.08% per 10 billion NTD capital formations. In Feb. 2015, the Ministry of Finance project report pointed out that signed PPP projects over the years had actual financial investment of approximately 30.6 billion NTD in 2014, to create economic growth rate of about 0.24%. Therefore, government is actively promoting PPP in recent years, and in order to attract private 100 billion NTD a year for the investment target. While PPP projects in the country has been an important part of the industry, but the push has derived some controversy, especially in the controversy of royalty. This study combined with game theory and EVA theory (Economic Value Added), established investment incentive and profit allocation two kinds of game model, used the difference between government and business firms operating in the same PPP project ability to create excess profits allocation ratio of the composition, and then analysis criteria established by the concept of game equilibrium through simulation of simulate and actual cases, explore the equilibrium conditions and outcomes of the PPP investment incentive and profit allocation. Investment incentive game provides government and bidders to evaluate if the minimum royalty formulated by government have investment incentive; this study proposes “fixed allocation” and “changed allocation” two modes to discuss. Fixed allocation mode shows it has investment incentive when the minimum royalty decided by investments ratio or act lower than the reasonable profit allocated by the capacity of the government and bidders to create excess profits ratio. Changed allocation mode shows it’s difficult to have investment incentive when the land value higher then bidders’ investments. Profit allocation game model provides government and bidders to decide the strategies and profit allocation of game equilibrium in PPP selection or bargain phase. This study proposes three commonly seen modes of bidders to discuss, include “rational participation,” “priority bid” and “priority profit” modes. The results show that when the capacity of government and bidders to create excess profits is similar, rational bidders will adopt an honest strategy, with each assigned half of the excess profits. When the cheat strategy becomes the equilibrium strategy, bidders should try to widen the gap between the investment plan excess profits and the actual estimated excess profits within a range acceptable to government to increase the chances of the bid or best profits.