- 學位論文
非合意併購對上市櫃主併公司股東財富之影響
The Impact of Hostile Takeover on the Bidder's Shareholder Wealth
摘要
台灣近十年來併購活動快速發展，企業併購事件至民國89年達到巔峰，近年件數雖然下滑，但非合意併購卻有崛起跡象。目前國內現況雖然仍以合意併購居多，但非合意併購在國際已蔚為主流，影響力不容忽視，行政院金管會亦曾有意針對非合意併購行為設置控管措施。本研究探討重點即為非合意併購事件對主併公司股東財富造成的效果，以檢視非合意併購與合意併購間的差異。 本研究針對併購進行事件研究，以民國84年至95年之187件併購事件為樣本，探討併購宣告對台灣上市櫃主併公司股東財富的影響，並以複迴歸模型檢視事件期間產生的累積異常報酬率與主併公司特性的關係。結果發現： （1）整體而言，國內投資市場對企業併購宣告抱持正面態度，產生正的累積異常報酬率，但存在消息提前走漏的現象。 （2）非合意併購顯著減少主併公司股東財富。 （3）非合意併購的目標公司經理人更換率明顯高於合意併購。 （4）董事長兼任總經理之主併公司，在併購宣告中股東財富顯著減少。 （5）相較於換股併購，採用現金併購顯著減少主併公司股東財富。 （6）上市主併公司的異常報酬率顯著低於上櫃主併公司。
並列摘要
In the past decade, the M&A activities in Taiwan grew rapidly and reached the peak in Year 2000. Though the numbers decreased in recent years, hostile takeover elevated. In Taiwan, the majority is friendly takeover, but hostile takeover is a mainstream of international M&A activities; the impact of hostile takeover can not be ignored. The Financial Supervisory Commission, Executive Yuan had attempted to set up M&A new rules to control hostile takeover events. The focus of this study is to investigate influences of bidder’s shareholder wealth under hostile acquisitions and to identify the differences between hostile bids and friendly bids. This study adopts event study methodology to examine the impact of 187 M&A announcement events of listed companies and OTC companies during 1995 to 2006 in Taiwan. Besides, this study uses multiple regression analysis to demonstrate the relation between bidder’s essential characteristics and cumulative abnormal return. The empirical results are listed as follow: (1) As a whole, stock market in Taiwan responds positively to the M&A announcements of corporate and generates positive cumulative abnormal return. It also shows that the M&A information may leak out in advance. (2) There is a significantly negative relation between the hostile bids and bidder’s shareholder wealth. (3) Target’s management turnover rate is significantly higher following hostile acquisitions. (4) IF bidder’s chairman of the board is also CEO, bidder’s shareholder wealth is significantly decreased during the M&A announcements. (5) Comparing to stock acquisitions, cash payment significantly destroy bidder’s shareholder wealth. (6) The listed bidder’s CAR is significantly lower than the OTC bidder’s CAR.