借殼上市櫃監理機制研究—以英美法為借鏡

借殼上市，係指未上市公司在集中市場或櫃買市場尋找經營不善或垂垂欲墜的上市櫃公司，透過私募或公開收購等方式取得控制權，且將自身業務移轉入上市櫃公司，達成實質上市櫃之目的。我國借殼上市始於1990年初證交所提高營建業的上市櫃審查準則，使眾多建設公司尋求借殼上市途徑，卻爆發了財務危機。往後，借殼上市亦伴隨在資本市場重大事件以後出現，如證所稅復徵、做空事件。使用借殼上市的產業並不專美於營建業，在科技業、文化創意業和生技業亦能見到借殼上市之足跡。我國使用借殼上市的動機主要為規避法律或政策，在借殼上市模式中，常會形成參與者與未參與者間的資訊不對稱，在資訊隱蔽性高的情況下，股東權益便有被侵害的可能。因此，在基因國際案之後，我國便訂定了借殼上市櫃監理規則，但時至今日，借殼上櫃情事仍時有所聞。無論是借殼公司和被借殼公司均能見到小股東權益受損害的情形，更甚者，危及到資本市場上的投資者。本文以案例研究歸結出我國借殼上市造成的問題有小股東權益保護不周、內部人與外部人資訊不對稱，以及造成證券市場價格扭曲的情形。為有效緩解上述問題，本文參酌美國、英國與香港的監理模式，分析三地資本市場的借殼上市監管機制，藉此對我國現有機制提出反思與批判。最後就比較與分析之結果提出如下建議，觀察期應拉長至一年，讓借殼上市公司應先至興櫃市場交易滿一年，而無須停止交易六個月，使主管機關在觀察借殼上市公司發展情況的同時，公司也能預先熟悉證券市場的運作情形，並保護被借殼公司股東之權益；另外，在股票代碼、公司簡稱或個股日成交頁面顯示殼風險標誌，尤其是在資訊空窗期、資訊提交不充足，或配合觀察期時顯示，以達到即時警示投資大眾之目的；而就中資借殼上市部分，在採取上市嚴格審查制的同時以保薦機制作為配套措施來分擔風險。本文期盼透過上述分析能補足現行借殼上市櫃公司在治理結構與市場交易面向不夠完備之處，並能有效降低借殼上市櫃所產生弊端的可能性，為我國借殼上市櫃監理機制建構可行路徑。

關鍵字

借殼上市；反向併購；中資來台借殼；保薦機制；殼公司

並列摘要

Unlisted companies look for publicly traded, listed companies with operating difficulties or that struggle in declining industries. The unlisted company then acquires control of the listed company through a private placement or takeover bid, and transfer their business into that listed company. In this way, an unlisted company can, in effect, become a listed company. This process is called reverse merging or backdoor listing. Reverse mergers emerged in Taiwan in the early 1990s, when the Taiwan Stock Exchange raised the standards for construction companies and real estate developers to be listed. In response, many of these companies used reverse mergers to become listed, making it known that many reverse merger companies were in dire financial circumstances. Later, reverse mergers usually coincided with important events in the capital market, such as the reintroduction of the capital gain tax, or instances of short-selling attack. Reverse mergers were also used in many industries outside of real estate development and construction, including but not limited to: the technological industry, cultural and creative industry, and the biotech industry. The motivation for using reverse mergers primarily rests in aiming to circumvent law or policy. Reverse mergers frequently lead to information asymmetry between participants and nonparticipants. When companies conceal information in this manner, the rights of the shareholders may be violated. Taiwanese supervisory regulation was drawn up after an insider trading case involving Genome International Biomedical shares. However, even today, instances of reverse mergers in publicly traded companies still arise from time to time. Whether the shareholders are of unlisted or listed companies, in both circumstances, their rights are violated. This also threatens capital market investors. This thesis analyzes cases of reverse mergers and summarizes the issues they have caused, such as inadequate protection of minority shareholders, information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, and market price distortion. In hopes of alleviating the problems above, this thesis studies the supervisory mechanisms of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Hong Kong, and compares them to the legal system and supervisory frameworks in Taiwan for the purpose of review and critique. Finally, by taking reference to the related developments under comparative law, this thesis gives the following recommendations. First, the observation period for reverse merger companies should be extended to one year, and the company should be traded on the emerging stock market for at least one year rather than having to suspend trading for six months. During this period, not only can regulatory authorities review the development of such companies, reverse merger companies are also given the opportunity to gain familiarity with the securities market, which also protects the rights of the original listed company’s shareholders. In addition, the extended period will allow time for the stock symbol, corporation abbreviation, or stock daily transaction page of all reverse merger listings to be flagged as a warning to investors, particularly during circumstances where information is otherwise insufficient or unavailable, or during the observation period. Lastly, with regards to reverse mergers involving Chinese capital, this thesis proposes stringent review of Chinese companies along with the establishment of a sponsor system in order to lessen risk. Using all of the methods above, this thesis hopes to close the gaps in the current imperfect governance and market transaction structure for reverse merger companies, and will also establish feasible supervisory mechanisms of backdoor listings in order to effectively curb abuse by reverse merger companies.