企業弊案之分析與投資人保護

A Study of Corporate Scandals and Investor Protection

詹彩虹(Tsai-hung Chan)

指導教授 ： 林筠 ； 柯承恩

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/財務金融組/碩士(2006年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2006.00390

摘要

美國安隆、世界通訊等企業弊案發生後，SOA出爐，國際間對公司治理重新再重視，國內的中興銀、台中商銀、博達、太電等陸續爆發企業弊案，主管當局、相關單位、學者專家及各界亦有相當高度的反應。
資本市場的機制是否順利運轉，端賴資本市場的參與者，包括上市櫃公司、承銷商、律師、會計師、投資者、債權人及主管機關的積極防弊等等，各善盡其責，遵守遊戲規則。然而企業弊案的所有參與者之間的利益衝突、利益謀合，使得專業被濫用、職權被擴張、資源被誤用等等，均為「逐私利」而已。
二十世紀以來，企業組織的改變，經營權與所有權分開，所有權者只剩下薪酬與盈餘的分配權，而將企業委託經營者並授權運用所有資源，為了監督與控管經營者不至於為了私利而犧牲企業組織的利益，因此產生代理成本。
從國內外企業弊案的個案追蹤、探討與比較，作型態與實例的分析，我們發現，現代企業弊案是集合專業、個制化、國際化等的智慧型犯罪，投資人的保護罩在哪裡？本文試圖做出結論與建議。

關鍵字

公司治理 ； 白領犯罪 ； 投資人保護 ； 代理成本 ； 弊案

並列摘要

The surge of corporate scandals in the U.S., such as Enron and WorldCom, and the subsequent passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act have led to a renewed interest in corporate governance internationally. Domestically, a series of corporate scandals involving the Chung Shing Commercial Bank, Taichung Commercial Bank, Procomp Informatics, and Pacific Electric Wire & Cable have sparked heightened reactions from the government, related agencies, scholars and professionals.
Whether the capital market mechanism will function smoothly will depend upon its participants, including the listed companies, underwriters, lawyers, accountants, investors, creditors, and regulatory agencies, to assume their own responsibilities and abide by rules of the game. However, the conflicts of interest and agreements of interest among all participants in corporate scandals have allowed for the exploitation of professionals, the expansion of power, and the misuse of resources.
Since the 20th century, the change in corporate structure and the separation of ownership and control have left owners with the responsibility for distribution of compensation and earnings, while managers as agents are in charge of the company and authorized to use its resources. Agency costs thus come from an effort to monitor managers and motivate them to not sacrifice corporate organizational interests for personal gain.
From case analyses conducted by investigating and comparing foreign and domestic corporate scandals, we discover that modern corporate scandals are intelligent white collar crimes which are professional, tailor-made, and international. Where is the protective shield for investors? This paper attempts to draw a conclusion and subsequently offer suggestions.

並列關鍵字

Enterprise Governance ； White Collar Crime ； Investor Protection ； Agency Cost ； Scandals

參考文獻

3.方涵妮，「博達事件對會計師事務所客戶股價影響之實證研究」，民國94年，國立台灣大學會計學研究所碩士論文。

10.史建倫，「博達事件對會計師事務所審計品質影響之實證研究」，民國94年，國立台灣大學會計學研究所碩士論文。

53.郭宇閎，「後博達時代上市公司財務危機預警研究」，民國94年，國立台灣大學會計學研究所碩士論文。

6.王金來，「從公司治理看財報常見問題與法律責任（下）」，致遠會計師事務所。

7.王金來，「從公司治理看財報常見問題與法律責任（上）」，致遠會計師事務所。