處理器的故障注入攻擊檢測與回復

Fault Injection Attack Detection and Recovery for Processor

石文緯(Wen-Wei Shih)

指導教授 ： 黃俊郎

國立臺灣大學/電機資訊學院/電子工程學研究所/碩士(2022年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU202200438

摘要

隨著嵌入式系統與物聯網的快速發展，資安的議題也隨之被更加重視，然而，嵌入式系統因為資源與成本的限制，往往僅配備軟體資安的防護機制，例如加解密或完整性驗證等。但此機制是建立在假設硬體是安全的情況下，而嵌入式系統總是被以相同規格與設計大量生產，只要惡意的攻擊者可以破解一個裝置，便能以相同手法成功攻擊其他的設備。
處理器作為整個系統的核心，安全的議題更應該被重視，而攻擊者卻可以透過簡單實現且低成本的故障注入攻擊影響處理器的運作，運行在系統上的軟體安全機制便不再安全。
因此，本論文提出一個輕量化且能快速偵測故障注入攻擊的偵測器以及提供一個使處理器能夠在被故障注入攻擊時，回復至已知且未受攻擊的最後狀態，並且繼續執行，如此一來，攻擊者便無法輕易改變處理器的運作，進而達到防護的效果。

關鍵字

故障注入攻擊 ； 時鐘短時脈衝波形干擾 ； 偵測器 ； 處理器 ； 回復

並列摘要

With the rapid development of embedded systems and the Internet of Things (IoT),the security issue becomes more important. However, due to limited resources, embedded systems are often only equipped with software security mechanisms, such as encryption and decryption or integrity check, etc. But, this mechanism is based on the assumption that the hardware is secure, and embedded systems are always mass-produced with the same specifications and designs. As long as a malicious attacker can attack one device, they can successfully attack other devices in the same way.The processor is the core of entire system, security issue should be paid more attention. But, the attacker can use a simple and low cost fault injection attack to affect the processor. Thus, the software security mechanisms running on the system are no longer secure.Therefore, we proposed a lightweight detector that can quickly detect fault injection attacks and provides a method that enables the processor to recover to the last known and unaffected state when it is attacked by fault injection attack and continue to execute. So that, the attacker can not easily change the behavior of the processor and then achieve the effect of protection.

並列關鍵字

Fault Injection Attack ； Clock Glitch ； Detector ； Processor ； Recovery

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