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  • 學位論文

獨立董事、家族持股與內部控制有效性之關聯性探討

An Empirical Examination of the Relationships among Independent Directors, Family Ownership and Effectiveness of Internal Control

指導教授 : 杜榮瑞

摘要


近年來國內外知名企業發生一連串之財務舞弊,顯現企業內部控制未能發揮預期功效,促使業界與學界致力於加強內部控制有效性之議題。本研究之目的在探討獨立董事以及控制-家族持股對內部控制有效性之影響,希冀提供在制定政策時之參考。 本研究係按2002年二月至2006年十二月之間上市公司為樣本;內部控制有效性之衡量方式是根據公司初次申請上市公開說明書內,所含上市前三年內部控制缺失建議點數;獨立董事比例以及控制-家族持股比例之資料則取自各公司年報與台灣經濟新報資料庫。在刪除資料遺漏值與金融產業類股後,總共取得一百五十六筆有效樣本,採用迴歸分析對樣本資料予以分析。 實證結果如下: 一、 獨立董事比例與內部控制重大缺失數量無顯著關係 二、 控制-家族持股比例與內部控制重大缺失數量有顯著正向關係 是故,除了證交法第十四條之二針對獨立董事設置之規定外,主管機關亦應考量控制-家族持股,以提高內部控制有效性。

並列摘要


Recent years have seen many cases of fraudulent financial reporting occurred around the world. The importance of corporate governance has thus regained the attention from academics, practitioners and policy makers. Internal control is an essential and integral part of corporate governance and the implementation and effectiveness of internal control have become more important than before. The aim of this study attempts to explore how independent directors associate with the effectiveness of internal control and how managerial-family shareholding relates to the effectiveness of internal control. This study uses the deficiencies in internal control quoted from the Prospectus for the Initial Public Offering of each sampled corporation as a measure of internal control effectiveness. The data for the factors associated with internal controls-percentage of independent directors, and managerial-family shareholding-are collected from Taiwan Economic Journal Database. The results based on 156 companies becoming listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange in the period from December 2002 to February 2006 are as follows: 1. There is no significant relationship between percentage of independent directors and the incidence of material deficiencies in internal control. 2. There is a positive and significant relationship between managerial-family shareholding and the incidence of material deficiencies in internal control. The results of this study suggest the policymakers that, while promoting internal control, managerial-family shareholding should be taken into account. Limitations and suggestions for future research are offered.

參考文獻


Baysinger, B. D., and H. N. Butler. 1985. Corporate governance and the board of directors: performance effects of changes in board composition. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 1: 101-124.
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被引用紀錄


余佳燕(2013)。內部控制缺失與審計公費之關聯性研究〔碩士論文,國立臺北大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail?DocID=U0023-0201201301022600

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