本文研究美國產險公司管理階層是否會為了追求個人薪酬,進而操縱賠款準備金,本篇論文同時納入股份型態及相互型態之公司做比較。研究結果發現當美國產險公司經理人之薪酬與公司績效連結性越強,經理人傾向低估賠款準備金以修飾公司盈餘表現,藉此得到較高薪酬,然而股份公司及相互公司,其經理人因激勵性薪酬而低估賠款準備金之情形並無差別。此外,本研究亦探討公司治理機制及沙賓法案(SOX)頒布後對於產險公司盈餘管理行為之影響,本研究發現當公司董事會獨立性越高,傾向低估賠款準備金,以及在SOX法案頒布後,美國產險公司傾向高估賠款準備金。
This paper utilizes the loss reserve error to investigate the impact of executive pay-for-performance compensation on the magnitude of loss reserve error in the U.S. property-casualty insurance industry with different ownership structure. This paper demonstrates that managers with higher pay-for-performance sensitivity are more likely to make earnings-increasing reserving decisions. In addition, this paper examines the effect of corporate governance and the SOX Act on firms’ earnings management. This paper finds insurers with higher board independence are more inclined to under-state reserve estimates. And after the enactment of SOX Act, insurers tend to undertake earnings-decreasing decisions.