立法院黨團協商制度之政治分析（2000.5-2010.12）

Political Analysis of the Party Caucus Negotiation System in Legislative Yuan（2000.5-2010.12）

郭明政(Ming-Cheng Kuo)

指導教授 ： 黃錦堂

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/政治學研究所/碩士(2011年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2011.10256

摘要

全面定期改選之立法院已是全國政治運作中心，主流民意可透過立法院來加以展現，相關議案亦可透過立法院審議達到合法化之目的，因此如何掌控並駕馭國會乃成為朝野政黨政治鬥爭的關鍵場所。本文從2000年5月至2010年12月政黨輪替過程中，以總統就任日為期，區分為3個不同階段，並舉出相關重大議案做深入觀察與分析，探討立法院黨團協商制度運作有何決定性之影響。
依本研究之觀察，近10年來，2次的政黨輪替過程中，相繼發生政治上亟待立法院解決之相關重大議案，就政治鬥爭之分析言，由於藍綠雙方政治版圖之板塊與核心支持選民結構兩大政治陣營之差距不大，競爭非常激烈，對重大議案之協商態度，常常伴隨著重要選舉之時程遠近，或該議案之敏感度以及其他重要之政治目的而變動，增加黨團協商之困難度。
由於現行黨團協商制度規定之疏漏與不嚴謹，藍綠兩方之政治勢力為了各自有利之政治目的，（例如在重大選舉中為了可以贏得勝選，或壓抑對方可以勝選，而在立法院黨團協商中所為之攻擊防禦策略）進而創造自己無論在法案或預算上之利多，爭取更多選民認同，讓政治力的不當操作而貫穿整個制度體制之限制，使台灣民主鞏固歷程走得並不穩定，但卻也透過立法院黨團協商機制，讓朝野政黨彼此有互動、溝通、妥協與讓步之平台，適度緩和激烈的對立衝突，凸顯此一機制具有不可磨滅之貢獻。
本文以歷史制度主義作為研究途徑，就此之觀點而言，立法院黨團協商機制之制度化運作，已使各主要政黨之行動者，在爭議發生之關鍵時刻均選擇以黨團協商制度作為解決紛爭之機制，並使黨團協商機制影響了事件的發展，且其後續發展路徑將傾向沿著相同方向增強既有模式，而排除其他替代的方案，因而產生路徑依賴。這背後來自各黨團所信任黨團協商最終所擁有政治力之影響。但這10年來在立法院實踐經驗，發現黨團協商機制仍存在不少運作上缺陷，因此就必須在現有之基礎上，進行制度之興革，以適應日後新一屆立法院即將產生新的不同政治生態環境之挑戰。

關鍵字

立法院 ； 政黨輪替 ； 黨團協商 ； 民主鞏固 ； 政黨鬥爭 ； 路徑依賴

並列摘要

Holding elections for a new Legislative Yuan at regular intervals has long been the operational force behind this nation’s politics. The Legislative Yuan provides an avenue for the people to voice their concerns and raise motions to be debated, ratified and passed as law. To that end, the authority to manage the Legislative Yuan is the reason why the ruling and opposition parties engage in political struggles. This paper analyses the influence and effectiveness of the Legislative Yuan in managing the political parties engaged in the debate and ratification of key motions selected over a period between May 2000 and December 2010, classified into three time segments based on the time served by each President.

Based on our observation, in the past ten years and after two changes in ruling parties, many significant political events occurred that required the intervention of the Legislative Yuan. In the context of political analysis, there was no major difference between the blue and green political parties in regards to political domain and electoral support. Competition was intense and the consultative attitude towards key motions often altered according to the time until the next major election. This attitude can also vary according to the sensitivity of the key motions or other important political agendas, adding to the complexity of party negotiations.

Due to loopholes and the lack of rigor in the existing negotiation process, the blue and green parties will create advantage for themselves either legislatively or where the budget is concerned. For example, in order to win the election or minimize the opposition’s chances of winning, the party will either adopt a defensive or offensive strategy in legislative debates depending on their political agenda. The political party will also manipulate the imperfect system and leverage any loopholes to increase votes. This undermines Taiwan’s attempts to have a mature and stable democratic system. On the other hand, this process of legislative consultation has also provided a platform for the ruling parties to engage in constructive discussions, communicate effectively, compromise, and concede. This capability to alleviate tension resulting from a difference in opinion and agenda is the key benefit of such a consultative process.

Our research is premised on the doctrine of historical institutionalization. In regards to this concept, the institutionalization of the party caucus negotiation system has already led to key political leaders in the main parties turning to the Legislative Yuan for arbitration whenever a contentious issue arises. As a result, the party caucus negotiation system directly influences the outcome of the motion, laying the groundwork for future development in the same direction without diverting from the existing model. No alternative motions will be entertained, creating a path of dependence. This notion stems from the fact that each party expects to gain political power as a result of legislative consultation. In the past ten years, practical experience with the Legislative Yuan has highlighted that there are still many operational defects in the party caucus negotiation system. Hence, there is a need to improve and revamp the process, building on the existing groundwork, in preparation for the challenges that would surely come about with the new Legislative Yuan and a different political environment.

並列關鍵字

LEGISLATIVE YUAN ； PARTY ALTERNATION IN POWER ； PARTY CAUCUS NEGOTIATION ； DEMOCRATIC STABILITY ； POLITICAL PARTY STRUGGLES ； PATH OF DEPENDENCY

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