自有品牌與全國品牌競爭下，對供應鏈整合機制之影響

The Effect of Competition between Store Brand and National Brand on Supply Chain Coordination Mechanisms

林宜青(Yi - Ching Lin)

指導教授 ： 蔣明晃 ； 郭瑞祥

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/商學研究所/碩士(2005年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2005.10071

摘要

通路的上下游一直以來存在著許多不同合作契約，因此近年來整合機制的探討已成為供應鏈研究中重要的議題之一，但是隨著零售商通路權力的擴大，零售商發展自有品牌的情形也日漸普遍，此時在通路上互相競爭的自有品牌與全國品牌，有可能影響製造商與零售商之間的合作關係。

本研究建構單一製造商與零售商的賽局理論通路模型，在自有品牌與全國品牌競爭下，有三種不同通路權力：包含Manufacturer-Stackelberg、Vertical Nash與Retailer-Stackelberg，以沒有整合機制的基本模型為基準，比較由製造商提出的數量折扣機制與零售商提出的利潤分享機制，並透過通路利潤、製造商利潤、零售商利潤、品牌需求量、品牌零售價與批發價來衡量。

經過模型的比較後，本研究得出三點重要的結論。第一點：自有品牌與全國品牌的競爭影響整合機制的效果。當兩品牌特性差距極大的情況下，製造商希望提升全國品牌需求但零售商則追求自有品牌需求的提升，使得整合機制因此失效。第二點：製造商與零售商在通路上的相對權力大小影響整合機制的表現情況。折扣後通路上強勢影響力的消失讓數量折扣在Retailer-Stackelberg下能發揮最大效果；製造商較大的影響力使得利潤分享在Manufacturer-Stackelberg下能發揮最大效果；在Vertical Nash下整合機制實行後需較多的溝通協調，才能使雙方同時得到增加的通路利潤。第三點：數量折扣機制有較佳的表現。由製造商直接給予折扣能使零售商為獲得全國品牌折扣好處而完全犧牲自有品牌需求，但是在利潤分享下由於零售商先犧牲部份利潤才能獲得折扣好處，因此零售商不願完全犧牲自有品牌需求，造成兩品牌在利潤分享下的價格競爭較激烈。

關鍵字

賽局模式 ； 供應鏈管理 ； 利潤分享 ； 數量折扣 ； 自有品牌

並列摘要

The coordination mechanism has become an important issue in supply chain management. With the growing power of retailers relative to manufacturers, the competition between private labels as offered by retailers and national brands as offered by manufacturers becomes more intensive.

This study constructs a game theory-based model in a manufacturer-retailer consumer channel. Under the different scenarios of Manufacturer-Stackelberg, Vertical Nash and Retailer-Stackelberg, this thesis analyzes the effects of coordination mechanisms on channel performance of private label and national brand. The coordination mechanisms include the quantity discount offered by manufacturers and profit sharing offered by retailers. Channel performance indices include channel profits, retailers’ profits, manufacturers’ profits, brand demands, brand retail prices and wholesale prices.

There are three main conclusions in this study. First, when the characteristics of private label and national brand are significantly different, coordination mechanisms can’t provide significant effect. Second, the power structure between the manufacturers and retailers affects the performance of coordination mechanisms. The quantity discount mechanism is most effective under the Retailer-Stackelberg scenario. The profit sharing is most effective under the Manufacturer-Stackelberg. Under the scenario of Vertical Nash, more communication effort is required to perform the coordination mechanisms. Finally, the quantity discount mechanism has a better coordination effect than the profit sharing mechanism

並列關鍵字

Game Theory ； Supply Chain Management ； Private Label ； Profit Sharing ； Quantity Discount

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