控制股東地位的形成與規範

The Formation and Regulation of Controlling Shareholders

龐元琪(Carol Yuan Chi Pang)

指導教授 ： 王文宇

國立臺灣大學/法律學院/法律學研究所/碩士(2007年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2007.00546

摘要

本文以實證上控制股東結構普遍，且於法律對少數股東保護不佳時尤甚之觀察出發。控制股東度所呈現係不同於分散股權結構下之代理問題。控制股東一方面不受表決權上的挑戰，則一旦其利益與公司偏離，公司法之規範作用即受很大的壓力。此時，應如何規範此股權結構係屬迫切。

應如何規範之首先涉及對此結構的價值判斷。控制股東結構於法律對少數股東保護不佳的國家佔較高比例；如此不禁令人懷疑控制股東結構是否僅是法律制度不周時剝削少數股東及公司的最佳利器，而值得我們去非難並解體這樣的結構。准此，研究的當務之急是去理解控制股東結構的形成原因、利與弊以求正確的規範角度與手段。

然無論最終對控制股東結構下如何之判斷（是否以解體之目的），應接受控制股東的某程度存在係無法避免。規範的方式需視影響控制股東濫用控制權之誘因而定。本文分析出規範現金流量權與表決權偏離及減少控制者私利之擷取兩方向。首先，偏離之利弊如何？應如何規範？第二，現有公司法僅對公司形式負責人課與義務是否足夠？如不足，控制股東義務之具體內涵為何，尤其相較於董事或一般股東，其義務是否應有不同？本文討論自我交易、逐出、一般經營及控制權移轉時的義務。

關鍵字

控制股東 ； 股權結構 ； 現金流量權 ； 強制公開收購 ； 逐出 ； 自我交易

並列摘要

This paper begins with the prevalence of controlling shareholders around the world, especially in countries with poor legal protection of minority shareholders. Such structure poses different agency problems than a dispersed structure: the controlling shareholder is insulated from electoral challenge, but its interests may be unaligned with the company due to low cash-flow rights. This situation puts extremely large pressure on the corporate governance mechanism.

How the controlling shareholder structure should be regulated concerns a judgment on the desirability of this structure. Its prevalence in countries with poor protection unavoidably triggers suspicion that it is merely a vehicle to exploit minority shareholders. Accordingly, we must first begin with a thorough assessment of this structure, and construct an analytical framework for future regulation.

Regardless of our eventual judgment on controlling structures, short of banning it altogether, we can foresee that this structure will still exist to some degree. This paper presents two angles for regulation: the deviation between control and cash-flow rights, and the extraction of private benefits of control.

Deviation involves both the pros and cons of a minority controlling structure, and thus presents a need for balancing by the legislator. The lessening of the extraction of private benefits of control necessitates the separate obligation of controlling shareholders as opposed to nominal control persons. In this regard, this paper discusses the contours of this obligation in cases of self-dealing, freeze-outs, normal operations and sale of control.

並列關鍵字

controlling shareholders ； ownership structure ； freeze-out ； mandatory bid rule ； self-dealing

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