考量木馬插入和前端探測攻擊之實體設計

Security-aware Physical Design against Trojan Insertion, Frontside Probing, and Fault Injection Attacks

許致瑋(Jhih-Wei Hsu)

指導教授 ： 張耀文

國立臺灣大學/電機資訊學院/電子工程學研究所/碩士(2022年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU202202298

摘要

硬體攻擊事件的急速增長以及設計工具缺乏安全性考量的解決方案造成嚴重的安全性問題在現代的晶片設計中。雖然有許多現有的對策對安全性的議題提供不錯的保護，但這些方法仍然缺乏在設計階段有充分考量安全性問題的全局觀點(Global design view)。本論文提出了一個在設計階段考量木馬插入(Trojan insertion)、前端探測(Frontside probing)和故障注入(Fault injection)攻擊之安全性框架。該框架主要由兩大技術組成：(1) 能有效覆蓋敏感物件之暴露面積的大規模屏蔽方法 (2) 基於單元元件移動的方法來消除易受木馬插入的空間。

實驗結果顯示，我們的框架能有效的抵擋這些攻擊的漏洞，並在與2022年ISPD安全性收斂之實體佈局競賽(2022 ACM ISPD Security Closure of Physical Layouts Contest)的前三名隊伍相比，能取得最佳的總分。

關鍵字

實體設計 ； 木馬插入 ； 前端探測攻擊 ； 故障注入攻擊

並列摘要

The dramatic growth of hardware attacks and the lack of security-concern solutions in design tools lead to severe security problems in modern IC designs.
Although many existing countermeasures provide decent protection against security issues, they still lack the global design view with sufficient security consideration in design time. This thesis proposes a security-aware framework against Trojan insertion, frontside probing, and fault injection attacks at the design stage.
The framework consists of two major techniques: (1) a large-scale shielding method that effectively covers the exposed areas of assets and (2) a cell-movement-based method to eliminate the empty spaces vulnerable to Trojan insertion.

Experimental results show that our framework effectively reduces the vulnerability of these attacks and achieves the best overall score compared with the top-3 teams in the 2022 ACM ISPD Security Closure of Physical Layouts Contest.

並列關鍵字

Physical Desig ； Trojan Insertion ； Frontside Probing Attacks ； Fault Injection Attacks

參考文獻

[1] Nangate freepdk45 open cell library. [Online]. Available: https://si2.org/open-cell-library/

[2] Security closure of physical layouts. [Online]. Available: https://wp.nyu.edu/ispd 22 contest/

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