公開發行公司股東之權利、地位與保障

Rights, Status, and Protection of Shareholders in Public Companies

林威良(Wei-Liang Lin)

指導教授 ： 黃銘傑

國立臺灣大學/法律學院/法律學研究所/碩士(2008年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2008.00633

摘要

本論文旨在探討釐清股東權利之本質以及其於公開發行公司中適當之角色定位，並據以調整現行保障股東權之各項措施。傳統公司法係以物權法中所有權之概念來解釋股東權的性質與其地位，在理論面與實際面似皆有其可議之處。是故，本文乃試圖自公司契約論所獲得之啟示作為出發點，主張股東實僅為公司眾多之契約當事人之一，作為本論文之基本理念，藉以重新檢討「股東」這個概念為何。首先先簡要介紹該理論之內涵，再以契約觀點解釋股東取得權利之權源與性質，進而針對「股東利益最大化」和「股東公司所有人」兩基本概念加以檢討，最終映照於現行制度下來看，提出本文所認為應予調整之淺見。另，為為文便利並避免龐雜失焦，故集中公開發行公司之股東作為本論文之研究對象。

公司契約論認為，公司乃各種明示性與潛在性契約的聯結點。和其他公司參與者一樣，股東與公司間亦係以契約關係作為連結，並透過契約條款之約定來形成彼此間的權利義務內涵。就此，股東權利與其他人之差異，實乃其所持有之契約內容不同罷了。而公司法之任務在於輔助交易進行，提供標準形式之契約條款，減輕契約當事人之締約成本。惟契約自由亦有其侷限性，為避免無效率或有失公平之情形產生，仍有賴政府適當地強行介入。

就股東利益最大化之檢討，本文認為公司應為自我目的而存在，不應係為任何特定族群所服務。故法制上應跳脫出追求股東利益最大化之囹圄，而發展出自主獨立的經營目的。至於公司實際上欲強調照護何種族群，擔負多高程度的社會責任，實乃企業自治事項，應由其自由形成企業文化，並受市場機制之考評。

理論上，股東在所有權關係之保障模式有其相對優勢，似乎頗能支持以股東擔任公司功能上之所有人的說法。但考量到現實面的因素，分散之狀態造成股東不合比例的成本負擔，降低誘因效果，反倒無法發揮所有人之功能。故在公開發行公司下，股東並不適宜作為公司之所有人。惟，股東仍須擁有部分而有限的控制支配權能，其適當之角色定位應為公司治理監督機制的一環，與其他監督機制共同分攤實現所有人所應發揮的功能。

為保障股東所期待參與公司分配的投資利益，仍有賴於公司法所規劃之表決權、轉讓權、訴訟權及資訊取得權等手段，且不同類型之股東亦各有所偏好，故仍不宜偏廢。惟，制度規範仍須作適當的調整，以反映出重新定位後之股東形象。

關鍵字

股東權 ； 股東地位 ； 所有與控制分離 ； 公司契約論 ； 契約連鎖理論 ； 股東利益最大化 ； 股東優位主義 ； 所有人 ； 所有 ； 控制支配

並列摘要

The purpose of this thesis is to clarify the nature of shareholder’s rights, and to define their proper status in the public companies, according to this study, then to review and to make adjustments to the system of shareholder protection. Traditionally, we intuitionally view shareholder as the owner of the company. This viewpoint of property, however, is defective and questionable in theory and in practice. Therefore, inspiring by Contractual Theory, I consider that shareholder is just one of the kinds of parties who have contract with the company, as my main opinion for reviewing the concept of “shareholder.”

The first part of this thesis is a brief introduction of Contractual Theory, and the discussion of nature of shareholder’s rights. Contractians hold that the company is “the nexus of contracts,” a combination of both explicit and implicit contracts. Under this theory, the differences of rights held by the shareholders and other participants are just the terms of their contracts. In a nature meaning, they are all the same; shareholders also bargain for their own interest and try to reach the balance between the parties. They invest their resources into the company for exchanging for the rights to participate in the distribution of profits, as the others do. Therefore, their rights are due to their negotiations, not inherent ones from the property they have ever owned.

The second part is the discussion of the status of shareholder, which is divided into 2 sections. First, we review the “shareholder wealth maximization norm,” and then the concept of “shareholder as the owner of the company.” This thesis takes the viewpoint that the company entity shall exist for their own purpose, not for the service for any participants, such as shareholders. This means that shareholder wealth maximization should not be regarded as a statutory norm, but understood in the context of the unique enterprise culture. Outside of the contractual obligations and statutory requirements, the company is free to decide to what extent of corporate social responsibility it would like to take. And its culture should be tested by the taste of market, not the government.

Though, theoretically, shareholder is better protected by the way of “ownership relationship” than “contractual relationship,” this claim is hardly sustained after taking account of the shareholding structure of the public companies, that is, the dispersion of shareholders. Most of them don’t view themselves as the “owners” and are passive to the affairs of company. Even though the controlling shareholders have better incentives to monitor the management, they may become another hard-controlled power axis, if we over-emphasize their function and empower them. In conclusion, it’s not appropriate to define shareholder as the owner of the company, after all they can’t function that role (as a monitor of the management) well, at least in public companies.

Shareholder, however, still needs some but limited control means, because of the specialty of their contracts. In this idea, shareholder could be viewed as ONE of the mechanisms of corporate governance, which achieve the function of owner altogether. In this chapter, rights to vote, to transfer, to bring the suit, and access to the information are all critical and important, and effective on different kinds of shareholders. For the changing figure of shareholders, the system of shareholder protection should also be made certain adjustments, including the dimensions in (a) the nature of the company, (b) shareholder activism, (c) general meeting, (d) controlling shareholders, and (e) derivative suit.

並列關鍵字

status of shareholder ； separation of ownership and control ； Contractual Theory ； Nexus of Contracts ； shareholder wealth maximization norm ； shareholder primacy ； owner ； ownership ； control

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