資訊不對稱與房屋市場:傳訊賽局方法

Asymmetric Information in the Housing Market: A Signaling Game Approach

李懿軒(Yi-Xuan Lee)

指導教授 ： 王建強

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/經濟學研究所/碩士(2021年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU202103671

摘要

本文以一個傳訊賽局模型討論資訊不對稱(Asymmetric Information) 在房屋市場中的影響。模型中的土地分為高品質和低品質兩種等級，土地品質是賣家的私有訊息。蓋在高品質土地上的建物可以為持有者帶來效用，相反的，蓋在低品質土地上的建物則無法。為了比較資訊不對稱對帶來的效果，利用Cho and Kreps 的直觀準則(Intuitive Criterion)，對比完全訊息的情形，如果資訊不對稱存在，高品質的賣家寧願降低單位房價以釋放出訊號來驅趕低品質賣家模仿他們。在本文的第二部分，我舉臺灣的實價登錄政策為實證案例。假設實價登錄政策可以消除資訊不對稱，本文的實證證據顯示實價登錄政策的政策效果與臺灣多數的城市房價呈正相關。此結果與理論模型的預測一致。

關鍵字

房價 ； 不對稱資訊 ； 傳訊賽局 ； 實價登錄政策

並列摘要

This paper develops a signaling game to discuss the impact of asymmetric information in the housing market. There are two types of land in the model, high quality and low quality. While structures on high quality land generate utility to its holder, structures on low quality do not, and the quality of lands is its sellers’private information. Under Cho and Kreps’ intuition criterion, compared to the circumstance when it is complete information, if there is asymmetric information, high type sellers would like to offer a smaller unit house price to signal themselves and deter the low type sellers from mimicking them. In the second part of this paper, I use the actual price registration policy (APRP) implemented in Taiwan as an empirical example. By assuming that APRP eliminates the asymmetric information, this paper provides a piece of empirical evidence, which the policy effect on most of the Taiwan cities house prices is positively correlated. This result is consistent with the theoretical prediction.

並列關鍵字

House Prices ； Asymmetric Information ； Signaling Game ； Actual Price Registration Policy

參考文獻

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Cho, InKoo, and David M. Kreps. 1987. “Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria*.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 102(2): 179–221.

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