使用非財務績效指標可以降低盈餘管理嗎?

Does the use of non-financial performance measures reduce earnings management?

范耿維(Keng-Wei Fan)

指導教授 ： 廖芝嫻

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/會計學研究所/碩士(2019年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201900919

摘要

本研究旨在探討短期績效獎勵制度中的非財務績效指標對盈餘管理之影響。為了降低經理人與股東之間的代理問題，企業會在經理人之薪酬合約當中加入盈餘相關的財務績效指標，以媒合兩者之間的誘因結構。然而，過去研究發現，使用財務績效指標將導致經理人有誘因操縱短期營運結果以達到特定之績效表現；近年來，許多文獻指出，非財務績效指標的導入，將能夠使經理人重新著眼於有利公司長期發展的活動，而減少盈餘操縱的行為；且根據不同績效指標分配適當的權重將有利於適當反映經理人之投入程度。
本研究以2011年至2015年S&P 500公司作為樣本進行迴歸分析，實證結果顯示，相較於在經理人短期績效獎勵制度中僅使用財務績效指標之公司，同時使用非財務績效指標之公司，其盈餘管理程度在本研究之統計結果中並未顯著降低；然而，使用非財務績效指標且有分配明確權重之公司，相較於使用非財務績效指標卻未分配明確權重之公司，前者盈餘管理的程度顯著下降。此實證結果與過去研究相呼應，顯示額外導入非財務績效指標，經理人仍可能受到盈餘相關的財務績效指標影響而進行盈餘操縱之行為，而透過分配財務與非財務績效指標明確的權重，能適當反映經理人投入各活動之價值，減少其進行盈餘管理之誘因，進而降低盈餘管理的程度。

關鍵字

盈餘管理 ； 非財務績效指標 ； 薪酬契約 ； 分配權重 ； 短期績效獎勵制度

並列摘要

This study investigates the effect on earnings management of using nonfinancial performance measures in executives’ annual incentive plan. To mitigate agency problem and align interests between managers and shareholders, companies employ earnings-related financial performance measures in incentive contracts. However, previous research indicates that the use of financial performance measures provides managers incentives to manipulate short-run operation outcomes to achieve desired financial performance. Recent studies show that using additional nonfinancial measures can mitigate managers’ distortion toward short-run operational efforts and refocus managers on strategic activities beneficial to the firm’s long-term prosperity. In addition, it is optimal to choose the relative weights of each measure to appropriately capture managers’ efforts.
Using a sample of S&P 500 firms between years 2011 and 2015, this study shows that the mere use of nonfinancial performance measures cannot significantly reduce earnings management; however, firms assigning specific weights to nonfinancial performance measures have significantly lower earnings management than those without the weighting. The results hold for both CEO and CFO incentive plans and are robust to the consideration of endogeneity. Overall, the findings suggest that managers may still have incentives to manipulate financial performance if earnings measures are used along with nonfinancial performance measures. To reduce earnings management, firms need to assign specific weights on nonfinancial measures to reinforce managers’ attention on nonfinancial outcomes.

並列關鍵字

earnings management ； nonfinancial performance measures ； compensation contracts ； choosing relative weights ； annual incentive plan

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