審計公費與審計意見研究：中國之實證

Audit fee and audit opinion researches:Evidence from China

林孝倫(Hsiao Lun Lin)

指導教授 ： 林嬋娟

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/會計學研究所/博士(2009年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2009.01157

摘要

中國資本市場無疑是近年來成長最快速的市場，會計師在其中扮演的角色也逐漸引起各方重視。在西方國家，大型會計師事務所同時是規模最大、歷史最悠久，也最具品牌聲譽的會計師事務所，在許多資本市場中，具有壟斷簽證業務的地位。但在中國，審計市場發展時間短暫，會計師事務所數量眾多，規模較小，Big4在上市公司審計業務的市場佔有率並不高，但部分省(市)中卻有審計業務高度集中於某一本土會計師事務所的情形，並且會計師出具非標準意見的比率偏高。這些中國審計市場的特色，提供我們一個完整檢視相關審計訂價與購買審計意見相關理論的機會。
本文第一章說明研究動機並介紹中國審計市場之發展。第二章分析會計師事務所規模、品牌、競爭程度對於審計公費的影響。以2002-2007年中國A股上市公司所揭露之6,657筆審計公費資訊進行分析，實證結果印證過去文獻對於會計師事務所特性與審計公費關係的推論，無論是事務所之規模、品牌或市場佔有率都對於審計公費存在顯著正向影響。本文亦發現，在中國市場中，除了Big4結盟所外，規模較小的事務所也可以藉由與其他國際知名會計師事務所結盟，取得公費溢酬；而不同品牌對審計公費的影響存在差異，與Big 4結盟的會計師事務所，比其他國際會計師事務所之成員所可以收取更高的審計公費。最後，本文分析會計師事務所對於中國國有上市公司審計業務之訂價策略，實證結果顯示，事務所對國有企業收取較低之審計公費，且Big 4相較於其他會計師事務所對國有企業之審計收費，有顯著降低的情形。
本文第三章討論中國上市公司購買審計意見的行為。企業是否透過更換會計師來取得較有利之審計意見，為文獻與實務上重要的議題(Chow and Rice,1982)。多數文獻顯示，取得非標準意見為更換會計師的重要因素，但並未有文獻分析取得非標準意見的公司，更換會計師的決定因素。 本文以中國2001年到2007年間，894筆前期取得非標準意見的觀察值為樣本。實證結果顯示，前期經Big 4或Big10會計師事務所出具非標準意見的公司、前期取得繼續經營有疑慮審計意見的公司，以及前期查核報告中，會計師保留多處項目之公司，次期更換會計師的機率顯著較高。本文結果印證過去推論，只有預期更換會計師後，審計意見改善機率較高的公司，才會更換會計師。本文也分析企業是否能透過更換會計師，取得較有利之審計意見，實證結果顯示，未被中國證監會調查中的公司，更換會計師後審計意見改善的機率較高，但被中國證監會調查中的公司，則無法透過更換會計師購買審計意見。此外，部分上市公司以連續更換會計師的方式，最終取得較有利的審計意見。本文實證結果可供資本市場與監管機構參考。

關鍵字

審計公費 ； 會計師事務所規模 ； 會計師事務所品牌聲譽 ； 國有企業 ； 審計意見購買

並列摘要

China has been one of the largest and fastest growing economies in the world. Since high quality auditing will contribute to the financial market, more and more studies recognize the importance of the auditing profession. There are some special characteristics of audit market in China. These characteristics include, (1) Big 4 auditors are not the largest auditors, (2) neither Big4 auditors nor other audit firms have taken a leading position in public audit market, and (3) in some provinces, there exist some local audit firm monopolized audit market. Such a special audit market provides an opportunity to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the audit fee and audit opinion shopping theory.

The first section of the dissertation introduces the research motivation and the general background of the Chinese audit market. The second part of the dissertation examines the determinants of audit fees in China. In the part, the research focuses on whether audit pricing is affected by auditor size, auditor brand name reputation, and market competition individually. Based on the data from Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2002 to 2007, this study finds that larger auditors (measured by assets audited by audit firm and total revenues of the audit firm) tend to charge higher audit fees. The results also indicate that the brand name fee premium exists both in Big 4 auditors and auditors who affiliate with other international accounting firms. Furthermore, this study finds that the regional leading auditors can earn fee premium. At last, the analysis shows that first, auditors charge lower audit fees to state-owned clients, and second, Big4 relatively offer more discount in order to earn more business potential in the future.

The final section of the dissertation talks about the audit opinion shopping behavior in China. Previous researches found that getting qualified opinion is the main reason cause auditor changes; however, none of them did further analysis about what factors affect the companies who get qualified opinions and decides to change auditors. Based on the observations from 2001 to 2007 in China, this dissertation finds that companies who get going concern opinion or qualified opinion form big4 or big10 auditors, or companies whose auditor are qualified more than one item in audit report last year, would prefer change their auditors in the next year. The results support the presumption that the probability of successful opinion shopping will affect manager’s decision about auditor change. This dissertation finds that when the company is investigated by the CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission), its engagement auditor will not issue the favor opinion. The research also finds that some companies try to get favor opinions by changing auditors constantly. The result of the empirical research might help to supervise and maintain the financial and audit market.

並列關鍵字

Audit fee ； Auditor size ； Brand name reputation ； State-owned enterprise ； Opinion Shopping

參考文獻

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