獨立董事法制與臺灣公司治理實例之研究

臺灣於2006年1月11日正式引入獨立董事制度，旨在藉由外部人之公正、客觀與專業判斷協助公司作成決策，並且要求一定規模以上之公司應設置審計委員會與薪酬委員會，期許相關法制能在公司治理上作出重大貢獻，維護公司利益並保護廣大股東與投資人，實為立意良善。然而證券交易法中有關獨立董事法制的條文十分有限，並且有部分定位不明、權責不清之處，尤其是我國目前尚有監察人制度，此皆造成適用上產生諸多世界各國所無的疑義；再加上主管機關金管會訂定大量相關辦法，以致細節性、技術性事項繁多，甚至有違反法律保留原則的情事，增加其複雜性。　　本論文逐一體系說明並詳細檢討獨立董事、審計委員會、薪酬委員會之相關要件，並適度與外國制度交互比較，以瞭解國際趨勢。其後，以臺灣在地之公司治理實例為評析對象，探討在現況下各該案例的獨立董事是否已忠實地、勤勉地恪盡其職責，還是制度使然，心有餘而力不足。鑑往知來，方可知當前的獨立董事法制應如何通盤精進，與董事會在公司治理之角色應如何轉型，以就相關弊失予以匡正、相關優點予以維持甚至加強，期許作為未來修正之重要參考。

關鍵字

獨立董事；審計委員會；薪酬委員會；公司治理；監察人

並列摘要

Taiwan officially introduced the independent director system on January 11, 2006, which is intended to assist companies in decision-making through independent persons’ fair, objective, and professional judgments. The independent director system requires corporates whose business sizes above a certain level to establish an audit committee and a remuneration committee. The relevant laws and regulations are expected to contribute significantly to corporate governance, maintain company interests, and protect the vast majority of shareholders and investors, which are all considered good intentions. However, articles in the Securities and Exchange Act pertaining to the independent director system remain scarce, and some of the articles are unclear about the roles and responsibilities of independent directors. It is especially so for Taiwan’s current supervisor system whose applicability raises doubts, which does not occur in other countries around the world. On top of it, numerous relevant guidelines have been set up by the competent authority, Financial Supervisory Commission. These guidelines involve many detailed and technical matters, or things that violate the principle of legal reservation, which leads to greater complexity. In this thesis, the essentials on independent directors, the audit committee, and the remuneration committee are explained systematically, reviewed in detail, and appropriately compared with foreign systems to gain an insight into international trends. The local corporate governance cases in Taiwan are adopted as targets for analysis in order to discuss whether the independent directors under the current situation truthfully and diligently perform their duties, or are prevented from doing what they want to do because of the system. Only by reviewing the past can we predict the future. By learning how to comprehensively improve the current independent director system, and how to transform the role of the board of directors in corporate governance, we can correct deficiencies while maintain and even enhance strengths. It is hoped that this study will serve as reference for future revisions.