韓國知識界的中國認識與中國論述
—從前近代到當代

當前韓國知識界有一個重大課題是：中國對韓國意味著甚麼？本論文是為了回答這個課題，選擇從韓國的知識史和各歷史時期的中國論述切入點，探討韓國與中國的關係性問題。本論文主要採用歷史研究法以及文獻內容分析法，試圖分析和歸納韓國的文獻，同時參考中文學界以及西方學界有關韓中關係的著作和文章。　　前近代韓國知識界裡存在著：華夷觀、小中華意識、對明義理論、再造之恩論、北伐論、北學論等論述。朝鮮知識界所抱持的對外認識基本框架是「華夷觀」。朝鮮初期在對外問題上依照「華夷觀」來推動「事大交鄰」的外交政策。而從十六世紀開始，朝鮮知識界將性理學的「大義名分論」加以體系化，將「明」視為「中華」，將「朝鮮」視為「小中華」。這時的「小中華意識」是朝鮮對自身文化自信的表現。「再造之恩論」是在壬辰倭亂（1592-1598年）時，基於「明朝救援即將敗亡的朝鮮」的認識上所出現的論述。因日本侵略而陷入危機的朝鮮得到明軍支援，因此，明對朝鮮的政治影響力得到強化，而朝鮮內部彌漫崇拜明的氣氛。朝鮮後期統治階層以「北伐論」與「尊周論」為統治理念。「北伐論」是對「清」的復仇雪恥的論述，也是透過攻打「顛覆東亞既存國際秩序的清」，以恢復朝鮮的自尊心和穩定的國際秩序。「北學」是指朝鮮後期主張「積極接受清朝的學術、文物和技術，使朝鮮的物質經濟變得更富有且提高生活水準」的學派。　　在舊韓末期、日據時期、冷戰時期等三個時期，韓國人的中國認識的變遷情況如下。首先將清日戰爭前後的「舊韓末」時期的中國視為「文明開化落伍者」。而在日據時期將中國視為「否定與警戒的對象」、「連帶與合作的對象」、「韓國社會改革的模範」等，表現出負面與正面的形象同時存在的複雜樣貌。接下來在冷戰時期韓半島分裂為南韓與北韓後，雙方將中國分別視為「中共夷狄」和「以血結盟的兄弟國」。此外，「冷戰」的政治現實塑造了韓國的知識文化面貌。韓國人的社會化和認同是在冷戰對立當中形成的，所以韓國知識界的問題意識受到政治的限制。同樣，再回溯到舊韓末和日據時期，朝鮮知識界也受到日本殖民史觀的影響。結果，可以得出一些結論，第一，韓國知識界的知識文化，從傳統時期到當代都受到外部因素的影響。第二，政治現實塑造知識面貌。　　在冷戰結束後，國際社會針對中國崛起議題，形成了許多論述，在韓國知識界也針對中國的崛起出現如下的論述：第一、中國崩潰論：美國等西方國家不會坐視中國的崛起，中國也將因許多問題陷入危機，而於未來像蘇聯一樣崩潰；第二、中國機會論：經濟上，韓國利用中國市場所提供的機會，會依然保持領先中國的地位；第三、中國威脅論：出於莫名的恐懼感，韓國社會害怕中國作為軍事強權，會吸收北韓，變成對韓國莫大的軍事威脅。韓國社會裡，有關中國的論述當中，討論最多的就是中國威脅論。　　對於韓國的中國論述，當前韓國進步知識分子對「中國威脅論」和「中國崩潰論」進行了批判和反省。關於韓國的主體意識較強的外交論述，值得關注的是韓國進步政權盧武鉉政府所提出的「東北亞均衡者論」。該外交論述是與中國直接相關的論述。「東北亞均衡者論」因「均衡者」(balancer) 這一名稱而受到國內保守派以及美國、日本方面的諸多批評，所以後來中途遭到廢除。對於「東北亞均衡者論」，韓國保守派質疑韓國是否有「能力」（capability）履行「均衡者」（balancer）的角色，並警戒進步政權「脫離美國勢力範圍而接近中國」的意圖。　　近代文明轉換以後，韓國知識界在經歷與新文明的遭遇、日本殖民、美蘇冷戰等過程，一步步走上否定中華文明和去中國化的道路。這是中華文明的離心力所引起的結果。對中華的否定是自我否定的一環，是否定先人世界觀(儒教價值觀以及事大國際秩序觀等)的殺父意識。韓國在那樣的自我否定中找到發展道路。冷戰解體使韓國擺脫於意識形態上的對立，並得到經濟文化上的發展。冷戰解體之後，韓國知識界再次對於透過自我否定，批判與反省西方中心主義的現代性，而努力探索新的道路。　　當代韓國知識界對傳統時代韓中關係中以朝貢體制為形式所進行的「事大外交」抱持着深刻的自卑情結。如果不能克服這種心理自卑情結，韓國就很難擁有健康的民族主義，無法作為兼具均衡感與和平指向性的行為者而在東亞發揮影響力，也很難實現民族宿願的統一。本論文認為，必須將小中華主義論述詮釋為健全的文明認同，亦即正面評價朝鮮知識界努力接受當時文明的普遍價值而建設文化發展的認識和論述，才能解決當代韓美關係的不對稱性或事大性格。本論文認為，「西發里亞」（Westphalian）體制雖然高舉國家之間主權平等的「理想」，但是國際政治中權力不對稱則是「現實」。理想與現實的差距是跨時代的權力關係產物。東亞秩序的「事大字小」觀念與權力不對稱的朝貢體制之間，同樣是理想與現實的悖離，與當代情況沒有太大區別。但是，壬辰倭亂以後，為朝鮮國內政治目的而誇大的「再造之恩論」和「北伐論」，是失去均衡感的極端論述或歪曲的對外認識。後來北學論登場，可以將之理解爲朝鮮知識界恢復均衡感的過程。在舊韓末期和日本殖民時期的韓國知識界，在擺脫中華文明而接受西方文明的過程中，經歷了很大的陣痛。而且透過絕對的自我否定，試圖恢復國權並富國強兵。對於儒教思想以及儒家文化的極端否定，以及對於東亞國際秩序事大傳統和朝貢體制的幻滅，是一種喪失國權的知識分子的心理陣痛。但其思想影響一直延續到當代，而成爲韓國知識界的心理情結。　　韓國社會在文明認同上已經將西方文明的民主、市場經濟、人權等視爲普遍價值，因此韓國主流的認識並不肯定中國的軟實力。雖然當前韓國知識界的主流認識不接受中國的文明力量和替代性，但韓國的進步知識分子還是因為期待中國重新創造新的現代性和普遍文明的力量，而關注中國知識界的思想發展。

關鍵字

華夷觀；小中華意識；再造之恩論；事大主義；中國威脅論；中國崩潰論

並列摘要

There is a major topic in the Korean intellectual community today: What does China mean for Korea? For the sake of answering the question, this research chooses the point of view from the history of knowledge in Korea and the Chinese discourses in various historical periods of Korea. In trying to analyze and summarize Korean literature, this research mainly uses historical research methods and literature content analysis methods, and also refers to the works and articles about Korean-Chinese relations in the Chinese literature and Western academic circles. This research aims to discover the perspectives on China through analyzing “discourses on China” in the Korean intellectual history. In premodern period, with regard to the discourses on China in the Korean intellectual community, we have Hua-yi distinction(or Sinocentrism), Xiaozhonghua consciousness(or Little Sinocentrism), Loyalty to the Ming Dynasty, Northern Expedition policy, Northern Learning Thoughts, etc. The basic framework for foreign policy held by the Chosun dynasty is based on the “Hua-Yi distinction”. In the early days of the Chosun dynasty, with regard to foreign issues, it executed the foreign policy of “Serving the Great(or toadyism)”, which is often forwarded as defining features of the Chosun court’s interactions with the Chinese court. It describes a foreign policy characterized by the various ways a small country acknowledges the strength of a greater power like China. Xiaozhonghua(or Little Sinocentrism) has the sense that Chosun was the last bastion of Confucian civilization. This conscious sense of identity, as a unique people preserving civilized norms, was directly linked to the second component of their construction of an identity-the source of authority for Korean civilization. In the three periods of the late Chosun dynasty, the Japanese occupation period, and the Cold War period, the changes in Korean’s Chinese understanding were as follows. First of all, in the late Chosun dynasty period, Qing was regarded as "the laggard in civilizational enlightenment". In the Japanese occupation period, China was regarded as the "object of denial and vigilance", "the object of joint and cooperation", and "the model of Korean social reform", showing the complex appearance of both negative and positive images. After the split of the Korean peninsula into South Korea and North Korea during the Cold War, the two sides respectively regarded China as "the Chinese Communist Party as an enemy" and "the brotherly country with blood." The political reality of the "Cold War" has shaped the knowledge and culture of Korea. The socialization and identity formation of Koreans were affected by the Cold War confrontation. Similarly, back to the late Chosun dynasty period and Japanese colonial period, the Korean intellectual community was also influenced by the Japanese colonial view of history. As a result, some conclusions can be drawn. First, the knowledge culture of the Korean intellectual community has been influenced by external factors. Second, political reality shapes the characters of knowledge of Korean intellectuals. After the end of the Cold War, the international community has formed many discourses on the issue of China's rise. The Korean intellectual community has also addressed the rise of China as follows: China collapse theory, China opportunity theory, China threat theory. In Korean society, the most discussed among the Chinese discourses is the China threat theory. South Korean progressive intellectuals have criticized and reflected on the "China threat theory" and "China collapse theory”. Regarding the diplomatic discourse showing South Korea's subjective consciousness, it is worth noting the discourse of "balancer of Northeast Asia” proposed by the Roh Moo-hyun government. This diplomatic discourse is a discussion directly related to China. This discourse was criticized by domestic conservatives and the United States and Japan for the term named as "balancer", so it was abolished halfway. Korean conservatives questioned whether South Korea has the ability to perform as a "balancer" and warned of the intention of the progressive government to get close to China by detaching from the influence of the United States. At present, the Korean intellectual community has a profound inferiority complex in the traditional Korean-Chinese relationship in the form of a tributary system. If this psychological inferiority complex cannot be overcome, it will be difficult for South Korea to have healthy nationalism. It will not be able to exert good influence in East Asia as an actor with a sense of balance and peace, and it will be difficult to achieve the national unity.