財務金融研究

Essays on Finance

張令慧(Lin-Huei Chang)

指導教授 ： 洪茂蔚

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/國際企業學研究所/博士(2022年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU202203427

摘要

現有文獻記載，家族企業在世界大部分地區佔主導地位，庫藏股是這些公司靈活的財務策略之一。最近關於庫藏股的文獻主要集中在買回庫藏股的動機以及其宣告的效果上。比較少文獻研究家族企業與買回庫藏股兩者間的關係。因此，本研究採用兩階段回歸的方法，透過臺灣的資料來分析家族企業與買回庫藏股。我們的實證結果推斷，家族企業的控制力遠大於非家族企業。由於家族企業的控制力可以透過交叉持股或金字塔結構的股權結構來強化，因此，與非家族企業相比，家族企業較少實施庫藏股。由於家族企業較不樂意於透過買回庫藏股來對外披露營運的資訊，導致大股東對小股東的掠奪效果更為嚴重。
除上述情況外，本研究還透過檢視臺灣經由庫藏股制度，使得少數股權者向多數股東轉移財富的可能性。無論家族企業的董事者是否同時擔任公司的執行長，或者公司的執行長是否同時也是公司的董事，家族企業傾向於買回庫藏股的目的是用來轉移給員工。此外，獨立董事的存在會減少這一趨勢，而控制權大於現金流量權的家族企業，則會族增加了這一趨勢。

關鍵字

家族企業 ； 庫藏股 ； 公司治理 ； 控制家族 ； 庫藏股買回目的

並列摘要

Extant literature documents that family firms are predominant in the majority areas of the world and that share repurchasing is one of the flexible financial strategies among these firms. Recent literature on share repurchase focuses primarily on investigating motivation and its announcement effects, but little research exists regarding family control and share repurchases. Accordingly, this study introduces a two-stage regression to analyze family power and share repurchases by a dataset from Taiwan. Our empirical results infer that family power is stronger than earlier predicted and that compared to nonfamily firms, family firms are passive share repurchasers because a family’s controlling power is enhanced by crossholding and pyramidal structures. Hence, family firms are less willing to disclose, and thus entrenchment effects emerge.

Except the above, this research examines the likely wealth transfer from minority investors to majority owners via share repurchase in Taiwan. The family firms tend to announce repurchase programs with the purpose to transfer to employees regardless of situations where chief executives including CEO simultaneously hold the positions of directors in the board or chief executive officers are chairpersons at the same time. Further, the presence of independent directors mitigates the tendency, while the ultimate dominant families with excess control over cash flow ownership increment the tendency.

並列關鍵字

Family firm ； Share repurchase ； Corporate governance ； Controlling family ； Repurchase purpose

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