多角化策略對企業超額價值影響之研究-以臺灣上市上櫃公司為例

The Impact of Diversification Strategy on Firm Excess Value - The Case of Taiwan

蔡苾瑋(Piwei, Tsai)

指導教授 ： 陳業寧

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/財務金融學研究所/碩士(2010年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2010.10387

摘要

過去諸多研究對於多角化與企業超額價值的關係尚未達到一致性的結論，且相關的實證研究主要還是以美國企業為主，鮮少有實證探討臺灣區多角化策略對於企業超額價值之影響。因此，本研究欲以臺灣區上市上櫃企業（不包金融業）為主要研究對象，探討企業從事多角化策略是否會影響其企業超額價值，又什麼樣的類型的多角化可為股東帶來價值，最後檢驗臺灣多角化企業的超額減損是否來自於經理人的代理問題。本研究以標準分類碼（SIC Code）來判定是否有進行多角化，再以Herfindahl Index來計算多角化程度，及採用Jacquemin and Berry（1979）的Entropy法將企業多角化區分為相關多角化及非相關多角化，並依照Berger and Ofek（1995）提出的超額價值（excess value）計算方式來推算多角化策略是否對企業超額價值造成影響，最後。本研究所獲之實證結果與結論如下：

1.多角化策略在臺灣多能為企業產生正面效果，帶來超額價值，且越是分散的多角化，企業超額價值越高。

2.臺灣企業沒有因相關多角化而享受到「範疇經濟」的好處。相反的，臺灣企業確實能藉由非相關多角化而享受到「風險分散」的好處，非相關多角化程度和多角化企業超額價值成正比。換言之，在臺灣的多角化策略實證分析與傳統文獻相反，在臺灣反而是非相關多角化益於相關多角化。

3.經理人的代理成本對於臺灣多角化企業的超額價值並沒有太大影響。此外，本研究尚發現董監持股百分比與企業超額價值間呈現負相關，且發現大股東持股比例和董監持股比例存在顯著負向相關性。

關鍵字

多角化 ； 超額價值 ； 相關多角化 ； 非相關多角化 ； 代理問題

並列摘要

Finance scholars spent more than last two decades answering the question – “Does corporate diversification create or destroy shareholder value?” However, the recent development in the literature on the relationship between “corporate diversification” and “firm value” is quite diverse. Furthermore, most of the empirical studies on corporate diversification are in the US.

By using DATASTREAM and TEJ from 2002 to 2007, this study chose the TSEC and OTC listed companies in Taiwan, excluding financial companies, as samples. In this study, we used SIC codes to define the industry segments and industry groups. Meanwhile, we defined “excess value" by the methodology in Berger and Ofek (1995) to investigate whether diversification strategy would affect firm value or not. Next, we utilized Herfindahl index and Entropy measurement (Jacquemin and Berry, 1979) to examine what kind of diversification strategy can create value for shareholders. Finally, we tested whether diversification discount in Taiwan is as a result of the agency problem or not.

The major empirical results are as followed.

1.In Taiwan, corporate diversification created value for shareholders. The more diversified the company became, the higher the excess value was.

2.Related diversified corporations in Taiwan did not enjoy the benefit of “economics of scope.” On the contrary, unrelated diversified corporations in Taiwan enjoyed the benefit stemming from “risk-reducing effects.” In Taiwan, firm excess value is positively related to unrelated diversification. In other words, the empirical result on diversification in Taiwan is different from traditional results – which is “unrelated diversification is better than related diversification.”

3.In Taiwan, manager agency problems (measured by equity ownership of managers) did not have a significant impact on firm excess value. In addition, this study found that the board equity ownership was negatively related to firm excess value. Also, block holder equity ownership was negatively related to the board equity ownership.

並列關鍵字

corporate diversification ； excess value ； related diversification ； unrelated diversification ； agency problem

參考文獻

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5. Berger, P. and Ofek, E. (1995), “Diversification's Effect on Firm Value,”Journal of Financial Economics 37, pp. 39-65.

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