消費者熟思對於資訊商品服務提供商的最適訂價策略之影響

Consumer Deliberation and Information Goods Pricing Mechanism

鄒仲庭(Chung-Ting Tsou)

指導教授 ： 周善瑜 ； 陳其美

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/商學研究所/碩士(2016年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201603166

摘要

本文旨在探討當消費者對於資訊產品的需求次數不確定時，資訊產品服務商之訂價機制該如何從販賣制及使用付費制兩者中作選擇。並將研究的重心放在使用付費制下消費者每次使用商品都會產生定額的心理成本(Balasubramanian et al., 2015)和販賣制下消費者深恐在低需求下支付過度的預期心理之間的交互作用。
此研究假設廠商有兩個訂價機制可以選擇：一為販賣制，二為使用者付費制。其中販賣制意指廠商向消費者收取一固定費用後，消費者即可無限制的使用此廠商提供之資訊產品服務；而使用付費制則是按照消費者對於資訊產品之使用次數逐一收取費用。研究假設廠商僅能從上述兩種訂價假設中擇一使用，或是同時使用兩種訂價機制。此外，本研究對於消費者之消費行為亦有兩個假設：一為消費者使用付費方案定會造成定額的心理成本，稱作計時器(ticking meter)效應；二為消費者雖於一開始不知道自身對於資訊產品實際的需求次數，但仍可透過付出熟思成本(deliberation cost)後來確知自己對於資訊產品服務需求的多寡。
本研究利用賽局模型分析得到的研究結果如下：當消費者熟思成本較低時，獨占廠商永遠會同時採取兩種訂價機制並誘使消費者熟思以區隔消費者；而當消費者熟思成本較高時，廠商會選擇提供單一訂價機制並誘使消費者進行衝動消費、即在不確定自身需求次數的情況下即進行消費行為。而在雙占競爭中，衝動消費大大加劇了兩家不同訂價機制廠商之間的價格競爭，當價格競爭太過激烈時，將導致使用付費廠商因消費者對其願付價格較低而無利可圖。

關鍵字

消費者熟思 ； 資訊商品訂價機制 ； 賽局理論 ； 多維篩選

並列摘要

This paper intends to understand the pricing mechanisms chosen by a monopoly firm facing consumers with uncertain use frequency. There are two mechanisms, selling, where up-front payment allows unrestricted use, and pay-per-use, where payments are tailored to use. In addition, we also assume that the consumers could know their use frequency for certain if they spend a deliberation cost, and using on pay-per-use basis arise a psychological cost known as “ticking meter” effect.
This paper shows that the monopoly firm would always adopt two mechanisms in combination to segment its consumers if the deliberation cost is low. As the deliberation cost is not low enough, the monopoly firm would offer a lower price compared to when it’s too costly to deliberation to induce impulse buying. This paper also demonstrates that selling is more attractive to the firm when consumers’ use frequency is uncertainty, since impulse buying is profitable and only occurs when selling is available. When it comes to duopoly, the chance that firms can lower their price to induce impulse buying intense the competition between two firms with different pricing mechanism. Interestingly, the feature that pay-per-use makes profit according to the total use frequency cause the firm which adopts pay-per-use more aggressive in price competition, but it usually leads to zero profit for the firm which adopts pay-per-use.

並列關鍵字

Consumer deliberation ； information goods pricing mechanism ； game theory ； multidimensional screening

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