德拉瓦州公司法制度研究： -以諾斯的制度理論為核心

An Institutional Analysis of Delaware Corporation Law- Based on Institutional Theory from Douglas North

趙珣雅(Syun-Ya Jhao)

指導教授 ： 王文宇

國立臺灣大學/法律學院/科際整合法律學研究所/碩士(2016年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201603170

摘要

公司法的目的之一即為處理公司不同成員之間的代理問題，而德拉瓦州公司法在美國各州公司法中具有卓越地位。據此，本論文聚焦於董事與股東之間的代理問題，並分析德拉瓦州的公司法制度如何平衡董事的代理權力與責任。
本論文採用Douglass North的制度理論以分析德拉瓦州的公司法制度，其中包含三個部分，分別為（一）財產權理論，其描述體制中個人與群體的誘因；（二）政府理論：政府如何界定與執行財產權；（三）意識形態理論：解釋人們對於現實認知不同如何影響其對「客觀」狀態變化的詮釋。
第一章是緒論。第二章為制度經濟學與Douglass North制度分析，制度經濟學說明制度的必要性在於社會中存在交易成本，而不同的制度可以減少交易成本以促進交易，並說明代理中主要交易成本為交易前的衡量成本與交易後執行的監督成本。
第三章為代理問題解析，介紹代理問題起於代理人與委託人間資訊的不對稱與利益衝突，以及處理代理問題時可能帶來的成本與問題，據此分析德拉瓦州公司法制度中，其如何依據代理問題嚴重性的不同，適用不同的審查標準，因而得以保留商業判斷中的裁量權，同時抑制濫用管理權。
第四章為衡量成本與相關判決，介紹機構投資者、股東投票諮詢公司，以及積極股東的存在有助於降低股東衡量成本，對應於此，德拉瓦州法院藉由仔細審視董事可能侵害股東行使公司民主化權利的行為，保護股東選舉權，並禁止董事為了避免公司控制權競爭的不正行為。
第五章為監督成本與相關判決，介紹股東訴訟外部性所導致的監督不足，以及對應該外部性問題而給予律師費獎勵。律師費獎勵藉由改變訴訟的誘因讓律師成為訴訟能動者去監督董事，但也可能因此產生濫訴與勾結，因此需要法院的介入審視。
第六章為德拉瓦州意識形態與總結，介紹公司註冊市場，因為該市場存在使得公司做為買方得以購買各州所產出公司法制度，而各州做為賣方可透過出售公司法制度而獲得稅收。公司法制度所產生的稅收盈餘，使得德拉瓦州願意投資於公司法制度以積極回應公司需求與競爭壓力。

關鍵字

制度經濟學 ； 道格拉斯・諾斯 ； 交易成本 ； 代理問題 ； 公司民主化 ； 律師費獎勵

並列摘要

One goal of corporate law is to deal with the agency problem between different members of a corporation, and Delaware corporate law dominates in the state corporate laws. Accordingly, this thesis focuses on the agency problem between shareholders and directors and analyzes how Delaware corporate law as an institution balances the authority and accountability of directors as agents.
This thesis adopts the Douglass North's institutional framework to analyze Delaware corporate law, and the framework includes three parts: 1. a theory of property right that describes the individual and group incentives in the system; 2. a theory of the state, since it is the state that specifies and enforces property rights; 3. a theory of ideology that explains how different perceptions of reality affect the reaction of individuals to the changing “objective” situation.
Chapter one is a preface. Chapter two focuses on institutional economics and Douglass North's institutional framework. Two topics are introduced: first, the reason institutions matter is that transaction costs exist and various institutions may reduce the transaction cost to improve transaction efficiency; second, the main transaction costs in an agency contract are the measuring cost and the monitoring cost.
Chapter three focuses on the agency problem analysis. I introduce here that the reasons of the agency problem are information asymmetry and a conflict of interest between agents and principles, and the costs and problems may arise by dealing with the agency problem. Accordingly, Delaware corporate law applies different standards of review depending on seriousness of the agency problem, and therefore directors can remain the full discretion of business judgment but be restrained from abuse of power.
Chapter four focuses on measuring cost and related Delaware court decisions. Institutional investors, proxy advisory firms and activist investors existing in the market help to reduce measuring cost. Accordingly, Delaware courts carefully review any board actions designed to impede the effective exercise of corporate democracy by shareholders, therefore protecting the stockholder franchise and negating unlawful efforts by the directors to maintain board control.
Chapter five focuses on monitoring cost and related Delaware court decisions. Positive externality of shareholder litigation causes inadequate supervision on directors and attorney fee award is used for dealing with the problem of externalities. Attorney fee award provides attorneys incentives to supervise directors actively, but also causes problems such as frivolous litigation and collusion, and therefore the court intervention is needed.
Chapter six focuses on the ideology of Delaware and the summary. Because of the existence of national incorporation market, corporations as buyers can purchase the corporate law produced by each state and states as sellers can sell corporate law to earn tax revenue. The tax revenue makes Delaware to invest its corporate law to response to the needs of corporations and the competitive pressure.

並列關鍵字

Institutional Economics ； Douglas North ； Transaction Cost ； Agency Problem ； Corporate Democracy ； Attorney Fee Award

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