信託財產作為特別財產之理論：概念體系與經濟分析

本文欲究明信託財產在歐陸法系國家之性質，以及信託財產與信託關係人之債權人、信託之債權人與信託關係人間之法律關係。首先，本研究考察了英美信託之起源與其物權理論傳統，並指出歐陸法系國家不宜以物權理論建構其信託制度，而應以特別財產理論作為信託之法理基礎，亦即，將信託財產視為特別財產以解釋信託之效力。所謂的財產，是指權利與義務的集合。原則上一個權利主體只有一個財產集合，稱之為主財產，但主財產亦得分割出不同的特別財產。而在信託特別財產理論下，信託財產與受託人之主財產互相分離，成為獨立於受託人之主財產外的特別財產。本文認為，我國現行信託制度已肯認信託財產為特別財產，並賦予其財產防禦及物上代位等特別財產之典型功能。其次，本文在此前提上，進一步梳理特別財產及主財產防禦理論，除闡述特別財產與主財產防禦的各種應用類型外，並以經濟分析之視角討論特別財產與主財產防禦制度所牽涉之影響。亦即，財產防禦制度得降低監督與代理成本，並帶來促進股份或受益權移轉、資本累積與多元投資等利益，但伴有機會主義行為與外部性等成本。再者，本文於特別財產與主財產防禦理論基礎上，具體探究信託關係人之債權人得否對信託財產取償，以及信託之債權人得否對信託關係人之固有財產取償的問題。本文認為，就信託財產防禦部分，信託財產具有完全防禦功能，惟委託人以特別財產脫免債務，或受託人未對應公示財產為公示時，信託財產將因此分別退化成弱型與無防禦狀態，以兼顧委託人與受託人等二者之債權人利益。就信託關係人之固有財產防禦部分，委託人與受益人之固有財產亦有完全防禦功能，但為避免信託關係人利用主財產完全防禦將內部成本外部化，無論受託人是否存在故意或過失，受託人之固有財產均無法防禦來自信託之非自願性債權人的取償。本文期待透過上述特別財產與主財產防禦理論框架，並藉經濟分析方法研究以信託財產為核心所開展之財產防禦問題後，而能對我國信託法制提供進一步的貢獻。

關鍵字

信託財產；特別財產；主財產；財產防禦；經濟分析

並列摘要

The purpose of this thesis is to clarify the nature of trust fund in civil law countries, the legal relations between trust fund and the personal creditors of principal parties in trust, as well as the legal relations between trust creditors and principal parties in trust. First, this thesis explores the origin of the common law trust and its property model and indicates that civil law countries shall not adopt such model, but use the separate patrimony model to explain the nature of trust, i.e. trust fund can be regarded as functioning as a separate patrimony. The patrimony is the totality of a person’s rights and liabilities. Each person, in principle, has only one patrimony called personal patrimony. Personal patrimony, however, can be partitioned into different separate patrimonies. Under the patrimony model, trust fund is segregated from a trustee’s personal patrimony and becomes a separate patrimony. This thesis points out that the trust law in Taiwan shows that trust fund serves as a separate patrimony, which granting trust fund functions of patrimony shielding and real subrogation. Secondly, based on the result, this thesis further proposes the theory of patrimony shielding, which introducing various forms of patrimony shielding and analyzing its influence. It is found that the patrimony shielding can lower the monitoring costs or agency costs, promote transferability of interest in an entity, and facilitate investment diversification and raising capital, but it also invites opportunistic behaviors and negative externalities. Thirdly, from the perspective of the patrimony shielding theory, this study further explores two main issues in trust law: Whether the personal creditors of principal parties in trust can enjoy any claim to trust fund? Whether the trust creditors can enjoy any claim to the personal patrimonies of principal parties in trust? With respect to trust fund shielding, this thesis argues that trust fund is in the form of complete shielding. Nonetheless, in order to protect the creditors of a settlor or a trustee, if the settlor is insolvent due to creating a trust or the trustee fails to register trust property that should have been registered, the trust fund will become in the form of weak or no shielding respectively. In regard to the principal parties’ personal patrimonies shielding, the personal patrimonies of a settlor or a beneficiary are in the form of complete shielding. Nevertheless, so as to avoid principal parties in trust to externalize the costs by resorting to complete shielding, the trust involuntary creditors have a right to reach the personal patrimony of a trustee, regardless of whether the trustee is at fault or not. By taking advantage of the above patrimony shielding theory and economic analysis, this thesis offers clear standards for deciding the rights and obligations among principal parties of a trust and hence contributes to Taiwan’s trust law.