論公共理性的理想與侷限

On the Ideal and Limitations of Public Reason

汪旻寬(Min-Kuan Wang)

指導教授 ： 吳澤玫

國立臺灣大學/文學院/哲學研究所/碩士(2021年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU202103230

摘要

本文的目的是探討能適當地處理民主社會中的政治歧見的公共理性觀點。在當代的民主社會中，公民抱持許多對立且不相容的價值觀，這使得公民經常對於社會制度有分歧的意見。於是，如何對於社會制度做出確定且合理的判斷就成為民主社會需要處理的難題。對此，羅爾斯的公共理性觀點提出可能的回答：這個觀點要求公民在公共討論中避免使用基於全面性學說的理由，而是使用可以合理期待所有公民都會接受的理由。這有助於縮小公民之間的政治歧見，進而讓公民做出具有正當性的公共決策，卻也引來許多批評。
本文將先梳理羅爾斯在《政治自由主義》中對於公共理性的論證，以及他在《政治自由主義》之後所做出的調整。接著，本文把公共理性所面臨的批評分為「不完備性的挑戰」與「不合理排除的挑戰」，並且分別做出討論。以不完備性的挑戰而言，本文認為在公共理性的限制下，雖然公民可能無法支持相同的結論或做出確定的判斷，但公共理性的支持者可以要求公民擱置無法以政治價值回答的問題，並且以二階決策程序來做出決策。以不合理排除的挑戰而言，本文認為損害人格完整性與擱置真理的批評都指出了羅爾斯的公共理性觀點需要被修改。最後，本文將討論幾個可能的替代觀點，並且指出這些觀點的洞見與缺點，進而提出「公共理性的開放觀點」作為適當的替代觀點。這個觀點保留了某些羅爾斯的公共理性觀點的洞見，也結合了某些其他觀點的特性，從而有助於改善羅爾斯的公共理性觀點所面臨的問題。

關鍵字

公共理性 ； 正當性 ； 政治價值 ； 不完備性 ； 羅爾斯

並列摘要

The purpose of this dissertation is to discuss the conception of public reason, which might deal with political disagreement in democratic society appropriately. In modern democratic society, citizens hold many opposing and incompatible values, which often results in divergent opinions about social institutions. Therefore, making reasonable and determinate judgment for a social institution is a difficult task that democratic society must handle. For that, Rawls’ conception of public reason provides a possible answer, which is to ask citizens not to use reasons based on comprehensive doctrines while proceeding with public discussion. Instead, they should use reasons that are expected to be accepted by all citizens. This can reduce political disagreement between citizens and enable them to make legitimate public decisions. However, there are some criticisms of Rawls’ claims.
First, this dissertation explicates Rawls’ arguments for public reason in Political Liberalism and the modifications he made after Political Liberalism. Second, this dissertation distinguishes between ‘‘the challenge of incompleteness’’ and ‘‘the challenge of unreasonable exclusion’’ criticisms that public reason has faced. For the challenge of incompleteness, this dissertation asserts that although citizens might not endorse the same conclusion or make a determinate judgement, those who support public reason can ask citizens to set aside the problems that cannot be answered according to political values and to make decisions by second-order decision-making procedures. For the challenge of unreasonable exclusion, this dissertation asserts that the criticisms of damaging personal integrity and setting aside truth indicate that Rawls’ conception of public reason should be revised. Finally, this dissertation discusses several possible alternative conceptions, indicates the insights and shortcomings of those conceptions, and provides ‘‘the open view of public reason’’ as an appropriate alternative conception. ‘‘The open view of public reason’’ retains some of insights of Rawls’ conception of public reason and combines some characteristics of other conceptions; thereby, it can solve some of the problems that Rawls’ conception of public reason has faced.

並列關鍵字

Public Reason ； Legitimacy ； Political values ； Incompleteness ； John Rawls

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