社群媒體假訊息管制之言論自由分析

假訊息議題，因社群媒體的興盛，於近年成為重要問題。本文首先從假訊息之定義出發，認定其為客觀事實錯誤，並探究何謂「客觀真實」，本文在此指出客觀真實與符應論間的關係。其次，本文將社群媒體上之假訊息現象，區分為新與舊兩個面向。新問題指的是社群媒體作為訊息溝通結構，與以往傳統媒體不同之處。本文指出，不論是訊息產製或傳播，社群媒體的興盛都使得假訊息更容易出現、更容易造成影響。而舊問題，則是指人們對於社群媒體的使用，可能會強化原先人類的行為模式，故社群媒體上之假訊息「對訊息接受者」的影響，因這些行為模式，可能更為嚴重。探究現象後，本文進一步探究管制社群媒體上假訊息之正當性。就釋義學層次，從德國與美國的比較法層次，本文認為就假訊息是否為言論自由之保障範圍、受到何種保障程度之問題，在不同憲法脈絡中會發生分歧。就德國而言，基本上認為錯誤事實並不在言論自由保障範圍內，例外才受到保護。而美國則認為即便是錯誤事實，也不會當然不受言論自由保障。故本文選擇進一步探究對美國言論自由實務影響重大的意見市場理論，並透過在理論層次上定位假訊息，討論管制社群媒體上假訊息之正當性。本文將意見市場理論內涵區分為真理的意見市場和公民的意見市場，並認為假訊息對於意見市場來說，屬於市場失靈，故有一定的管制正當性。就真理的意見市場理論，假訊息所彰顯的不只是新興科技對意見市場發現真理預設的挑戰，而是彰顯意見市場其實不一定與發現真理有關，前者是現象造成的失靈，而後者是理論既有的缺陷。故真理的意見市場，本身即無法處理假訊息所帶來之問題。而就公民的意見市場理論而言，本文認為，依保護意見市場之目的（公共領域），又可區分為健全民主程序（狹義），或是促進民主自治（廣義）之版本，而不論是何種版本，假訊息皆會對公共領域造成負面影響，進一步影響其目的，故在理論層次，亦有一定的管制正當性，只是必須進一步與政府介入可能帶來的弊害衡量。本文並提出從此理論角度出發，於實際法律之制度設計時，可以考量的降低弊害、提升管制正當性的類型化。最終，本文討論何為管制社群媒體上假訊息之有效手段，本文透過探究當代社群媒體作為言論傳播之中介、對其平台上言論之管制，認為社群媒體之自我管制作為管制假訊息之手段，會具有缺陷，進而使得社群媒體自我管制，無法有效解決假訊息問題。因應上述缺陷，本文主張可以有效管制假訊息、兼顧對使用者言論自由權利保障之元管制模式，透過公權力設定政策目標、被管制目標擁有一定之自我管制權限之方式，達到前述兩個政策目標，而此元管制模式之正當性，本文認為可透過社群媒體於當代佔據的資訊守門人地位加以證成。於提出抽象之元管制模式後，本文並以德國近年通過之網路執行法，作為本文參考的具體立法例，並探究其在我國憲法脈絡，是否合憲。本文認為，網路執行法在我國違憲審查中，可以通過正當性、必要性、適當性之審查，但就衡平性而言，儘管在假訊息管制之部分，本文認為要求社群媒體處理假訊息之公共利益大於社群媒體利益，故能通過衡平性之檢驗，但就保護使用者言論自由權利之部分，網路執行法反而因保護不足，而有違憲之虞，本文並於最終提出能夠適當保護使用者言論自由之可能措施。

關鍵字

社群媒體；社群媒體上假訊息管制；言論自由；意見市場理論；民主理論；自我管制；網路科技；守門人；元管制模式

並列摘要

Disinformation has become a significant question since the emergence/prevalence of social media. At the beginning of this thesis, I define disinformation as facts that are objective false, and explore what we mean by objective true. By doing so, I indicate the relationship between objective truth and correspondence theory. That is: A true proposition (or sentence, statement, belief) means that it must correspond to facts or external objective objects. Then I refute some (but not all) philosophical claims that deny the existence of objective truth. This thesis clarifies the phenomenon of Disinformation on Social media into two dimension, one is the new problem, and the other is the old problem. Referring to the new problem, I mean the structure of information communication concerning social media is much different from the traditional one. I point out that whether in production or the spread of information, the rise and prevalence of social media have made disinformation more likely to appear and cause more impact. The old problem refers to some human behavior patterns are amplified when using social media. Therefore, the effect of Disinformation on social media on how people receive and deliver massage, may be more serious due to these existing behavior patterns. This Thesis further explores the legitimacy of regulating disinformation on social media. At the practical level, I take Germany and the United States as comparative examples of freedom of speech, arguing that the answers to Disinformation problems –not only whether disinformation is in the scope of freedom of speech but also to what degree should we protect it-- will be different concerning different constitutional contexts. As far as Germany is concerned, it basically stated that false facts are not within the scope of freedom of speech protection, and only exception is protected. In contrast, The United States believes that even if the facts are wrong, they will still be protected from freedom of speech. I choose to further explore these problems by taking the marketplace of idea theory into account. Because it has been the backbone of the development of the freedom of speech in America for a long time, influencing both discourses of academia and the doctrines of freedom of speech. By locating disinformation in the marketplace of idea theory, I focus on the legitimacy of regulating disinformation on social media at the theoretical level. This thesis distinguishes two versions of marketplace of idea theory. One is the marketplace of idea of truth, the other is the marketplace of idea of democracy. I argue that disinformation is the market failure of both versions, so it is legitimate to regulate disinformation. For the marketplace of idea of truth, I propose that Disinformation highlights not only the challenge of new technologies making the marketplace of idea of truth difficult to function well to seek truth, but also the theoretical flaw that the marketplace of idea of truth is not necessarily related to the discovery of truth. The former market failure is caused by phenomenal change, and the latter is the fundamental flaws of the presupposition of the theory. As for the marketplace of idea theory of democracy, By the purpose of protecting marketplace (that is the public discourse), I distinguish two subversions of democratic marketplace: one is to promote effective functioning of the democratic process(in narrow sense), the other is to promote democratic self-governance(in broader sense). I argue that disinformation will not only cause negative impact on both subversions of marketplace of idea of democracy, but also affect their purpose. Therefore, at this theoretical level, it is legitimate to regulate disinformation, but it must be further measured with the possible harm caused by government. At last, I propose that when designing the actual legal system to regulate Disinformation, we can take some factors into account to reduce the harm and maintain the legitimacy of the regulation. In the last part of thesis, I discuss what is an effective mean of controlling Disinformation on social media. I explore the role of contemporary social media as an intermediary of speech dissemination, and it’s capability of controlling speech on its platforms. Then I further examine the self-regulation of social media as the controlling model of Disinformation. I argue this self-regulation model as regulating methods will have defects, and these defects finally make self-regulation of social media unable to effectively solve the problem of Disinformation. In response to defects above, this thesis proposes the meta-regulation model that can effectively deal with Disinformation and take users’ freedom of speech on social media platform into account. The meta-regulation model requires policy goals set by public power, but at the same time, it lets regulated targets have certain self-regulation discretion to decide how to meet policy goals . And I argue this meta-regulation model can be justified by the status as information gatekeeper occupied by social media in contemporary times. After proposing the concept of this meta-regulation model, I use Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz (Germany’s Network Enforcement Act, also called NetzDG) passed by Germany in recent years as the specific legislative example of meta- regulation model, and examine whether it will be unconstitutional in Taiwan’s constitutional context. I argue that NetzDG as the meta-regulation model, it’s aim of regulating Disinformation and protecting user’s freedom of speech, is legitimate, and NetzDG, as a measure, is suitable and necessary to achieve that regulating aim. In terms of equitable principle, on the one hand, the public interest of regulating Disinformation outweighs the interest of social media, so it can pass the equitable principle regarding requiring social media regulating Disinformation by force. On the other hand, however, user’s freedom of speech is not sufficiently protected by NetzDG. Therefore, in terms of protection of user’s freedom of speech, NetzDg might be unconstitutional. This thesis finally recommends some appropriate and possible measures to protect users’ freedom of speech.

並列關鍵字

Social Media ； Disinformation ； Freedom of Speech ； Marketplace of Ideas Theory ； Marketplace of Ideas of Truth ； Marketplace of Ideas of Democracy ； Self-Regulation ； Social Media and Technology of Internet ； Gatekeeper ； Meta-Regulation