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  • 學位論文

信息不對稱、融資約束與企業R&D投資——來自中國A股高新技術上市公司的證據

Information Asymmetry, Financing Constraints and Corporate R&D Investment: Empirical Evidence from the High and New Technology Listed Companies in China’s A-share Market

指導教授 : 洪茂蔚

摘要


本文採用2008年至2014年中國A股市場對研發費用進行了披露的全部高新技術上市公司作為樣本,從R&D投資對內部現金流的敏感性的視角,對高新技術企業R&D投資所面臨的融資約束問題進行了實證研究。首先,本文結合信息不對稱理論和委託代理理論分析了企業R&D投資的融資約束問題;其次,從理論上探討了機構持股比例和大眾關注度對R&D投資所面臨的融資約束的緩解作用;最後,以2008-2014年中國A股高新技術上市公司的研發數據作為研究樣本,通過檢驗R&D投資-現金流敏感性驗證企業的R&D投資是否存在融資約束,並在此基礎上進一步檢驗了機構持股比例和大眾關注度對R&D投資-現金流敏感性的影響。 研究結果表明:(1)中國高新技術上市公司的R&D投資存在一定程度的融資約束問題,企業在為研發活動融資時明顯依賴於內部現金流,其次是權益融資,最後才是債務融資渠道;(2)R&D投資支出與機構持股比例顯著正相關,機構持股比例的提高有助於促進企業進行R&D投資;(3)隨著大眾關注度的提高,R&D投資-現金流敏感性顯著減弱,即一般投資者的主動關注和信息發掘行為可以降低企業R&D投資所面臨的融資約束程度。

並列摘要


In this paper we re-examine the financing constraints on R&D investment from the respect of investment-cash flow sensitivity, by making an empirical analysis on the samples of the high and new technology listed companies which had disclosed R&D expenses during the period from 2008 to 2014 in China’s A-share market. First of all, we analyze the corporate R&D financing constraints based on information asymmetry and principal-agent theory. Secondly, we theoretically discuss the possibility of institutional ownership and public attention being information asymmetry proxy variables related to R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity. Finally, we test the R&D investment of our sample companies whether being in the existence of financing constraints, and the buffering effect of institutional ownership and public attention on R&D financing constraints. Our findings indicate that: (1) China’s High and new technology listed companies is financially constrained on R&D investment, their investment decisions strongly depend on corporate internal cash flow; (2) the relationship between R&D investment and institutional ownership is significantly positive, which indicates that the increasing of institutional ownership can promote the R&D investment; (3) to a certain extent, public attention solves the information asymmetry problem caused by R&D activities and decreases the degree of R&D financing constraints.

參考文獻


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