2007年金融危機下美國監理官選任機制對產險業監理活動之影響

美國自2007年爆發次貸危機以來，帶來的衝擊由本土擴散至國外，接連造成全球金融市場爆發金融危機，也連帶衝擊許多金融產業，諸如銀行、保險、證券業等皆深受其害。本研究旨在探討金融危機的衝擊下，美國保險監理制度中的保險監理官推選方式，是否會影響其對保險公司採取的監理活動，假定在兩種推選方式下所實施的監理干預相差無幾，則可推斷政治因素不影響保險監理官對監理干預的實施，但若有差異，則可推斷保險監理官可能因為連任等考量，而偏好不實行監理干預，使得保險公司受金融危機影響，可能須面臨更大的風險。使用difference-in-difference研究方法和離散型風險模式(discrete-time hazard model)來進行假說檢驗，樣本來自美國保險監理官協會的資料庫中產險業保險公司，變數包括受監理干預與否、交互作用項及公司、州、監理層級之控制變數。結果卻發現金融危機對於監理干預的影響為不顯著，而公眾選舉產生的監理官與州政府任命的監理官在沒有金融危機時是有差異的，但在金融危機時是無差異的，可能隱含在面對系統性風險時，監理官的選任機制較不會影響監理干預。

關鍵字

金融危機；監理干預；監理官選任機制

並列摘要

Since the outbreak of the U.S. Subprime Mortgage Crisis in 2007, the impacts had spread from the local to foreign countries, causing the Financial Crisis in the global financial market one after another, and also affecting many financial industries, such as banking, insurance, and securities industries. This study aimed to explore whether the selection method of insurance commissioners in the U.S. insurance regulatory system will affect the regulatory intervention adopted by insurance companies under the impact of the Financial Crisis. It was assumed that the regulatory interventions implemented under the two selection methods are almost the same. It could be inferred that political factors do not affect the implementation of regulatory intervention by insurance commissioners, but if there are differences, it can be inferred that insurance commissioners may prefer not to implement regulatory intervention due to considerations such as re-election, which makes insurance companies affected by the Financial Crisis and may have to face greater risks. We conducted hypothesis testing by using the difference-in-difference research method and discrete-time hazard model. The sample comes from the property-casualty insurance companies in the database of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. The variables include whether the intervention is interfered or not, interaction effects and control variables such as the company, state, and regulatory levels. It turned out that the impact of the Financial Crisis on regulatory intervention is not significant, and the commissioners elected by the public and appointed by the state government are different when there is no Financial Crisis, but there is no difference in the Financial Crisis, which implied when facing systemic risks, the selection methods of commissioners will not affect regulatory intervention.