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  • 學位論文

公開發行公司經濟犯罪之跨部門監控

A Cross-Sector Mechanism for Controlling Economic Crime in Public Companies

指導教授 : 曾宛如
共同指導教授 : 王兆鵬

摘要


美國政府追訴證券市場上經濟犯罪的成效卓著,一般認為有兩個關鍵因素:一是SEC的平行調查,掌握了蒐證的時效性與完整性,檢方才得以在最短的時間內將被告定罪;二是檢方運用追訴協議獲取被告公司合作,進而追究相關之自然人責任。2008年馬多夫詐欺案爆發後,曝露出SEC在監控作業上的漏洞,其檢討後認為,1934年證券交易法對吹哨者既有的保護與獎勵不足,於是在2010年時增列了相關條款,並於內部設置處理各類通報資訊之單位,運用風險控管的概念過濾出潛藏在市場中的不法行為。從此發展來看,運用「吹哨者-證券主管機關-檢調單位」的合作模式對抗證券市場上的經濟犯罪,已成趨勢。   在我國,證券市場上最常見的經濟犯罪是公司經營者舞弊。雖然金管會和證交所有獎勵吹哨者的措施,檢方也積極與金管會建立起各種合作管道,查緝成效仍舊不盡理想。因此,本文試著從力霸等幾個重要的個案出發,了解問題所在,再透過比較法研究,找出合適的改革方向,主要的研究成果如下: (一)平行調查。金管會僅能就管制對象進行調查,對檢方的蒐證工作幫助有限;而檢方則因金融專業不足,以致許多起訴的重大案件,都出現舉證不足的問題。過去立法者因為擔心機關濫權,將金管會行使調查權的對象大幅限縮,惟稅法賦予稅捐機關的調查權即是以案件關係人為對象,並未發生機關濫權之爭議,而且被調查者的權利也因行政法制的逐步落實獲得保障。因此,如欲提高犯罪追訴效率,應許金管會對所有違反證券法令、破壞市場秩序之人進行調查。 (二)追訴協議。我國勉強近似的概念為緩起訴處分,在少數採取兩罰制的特別刑法領域中(如銀行法),檢察官或許可以緩起訴處分和被告公司達成協議,減輕追訴上的負擔,不過目前實務上並無案例可循。有鑑於公司犯罪在美國所生爭議,本文認為我國暫無仿效必要;至於公司經營者個人之犯罪,目前有以緩起訴處分之例,惟其行使應謹慎衡量公平正義與比例原則之關係,以免助長行為人的僥倖心態。 (三)吹哨政策。其核心概念包括保護和獎勵兩者,我國並無類似沙賓法之規定,吹哨者必須蒙受通報衍生的責任風險;此外,金管會和證交所雖設有獎勵辦法,金額卻不具吸引力。因此,為了早期發覺不法、阻止損害擴大,未來除了應將通報標準、受理對象、責任免除等規定明文化,並應提高獎金數額,才能激發私人揭弊動機。 (四)資訊過濾。金管會透過證交所等周邊單位,能獲得各類市場訊息,並有解讀其經濟意義之能力,但就當中是否涉及犯罪的敏銳度則有不足。為此,可在金管會內部設置一兼具金融和刑事專業的單位,藉由資訊的彙整與分析,篩選出違法風險較高的標的,進行蒐證後再綜合判讀,以期在第一時間內發覺不法。

並列摘要


The U.S. government has a remarkable achievement in prosecution of economic crime in the securities market, which is generally attributed to two crucial factors: the first is the parallel investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It makes evidence collection prompt and complete, and then helps prosecutors obtain convictions in the shortest time; the second is prosecution agreements, through which prosecutors work with the charged corporation to prosecute related individuals responsible for the malfeasance. After the outbreak of Madoff scandal in 2008, the SEC reviewed its regulatory failure and believed that whistleblower protection and incentive offered by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were insufficient. Therefore, the relevant section was added to the Act in 2010. And a new SEC office was built to deal with various information received, then to filter what is under the table by means of risk management. In view of these developments, using the cooperative model of whistleblower, securities agency and prosecutor to combat economic crime in the securities market has become a trend. Management fraud is the most common type of economic crime in Taiwan’s securities market. Although there are whistleblower awards, issued by the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) and the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TSEC), and various cooperative methods between prosecutors and the FSC, the investigating efficiency still falls short of expectations. Therefore, this thesis tries to figure the problems out though several critical cases such as the Rebar scandal, then undertakes comparative legal research to look for an appropriate reform direction. The chief results of this research are as follows: (1) Parallel Investigations: the FSC offers a limited help to prosecutors’ evidence collection because it can investigate its regulated objects only. As for prosecutors, not having a sufficient competence in finance, they had brought many important charges but failed to meet the burden of proof. Legislators narrowed down the scope of the FSC investigation because they worried about its abuse of power. Tax agencies, however, have been authorized to investigate anyone related to the case in question but does not cause such controversy. In addition, the rights of those under investigation have been protected with administrative laws carried out gradually. To boost the prosecution efficiency, it will be necessary for the FSC to investigate anyone in violation of securities regulation and undermining the market order. (2) Prosecution Agreements: the remotely similar concept in Taiwan is deferred prosecution. In quite a few special criminal laws adopting double punishment (i.e. the Bank Act), it is possible for prosecutors to use deferred prosecution for negotiation with the charged company, which reduces their burden of prosecution, although there are no such cases in practice. In view of controversies about corporate crime in America, this thesis asserts that, for the time being, it is unnecessary for Taiwan to follow America’s step. As regards crime committed by the corporate management, there are cases ending with deferred prosecution. To avoid encouraging opportunism, the correlation between justice and the principle of proportionality should be evaluated cautiously. (3) Whistleblower Policy: protection and awards make the central concept. In Taiwan, whistleblowers have to risk being accountable for reporting without laws similar to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; the FSC and the TSEC both offer bounties while the amount is not appealing. In order to early detect misconduct and prevent further damages, it will be necessary to legislate for whistle-blowing standards, recipients of fraud report, immunity from accountabilities and so on, and to raise bounty amount to motivate fraud disclosure. (4) Information Filter: the FSC can obtain a variety of market information through affiliated organizations like the TSEC. It is capable of economic interpretation of this information while is not sensitive to the crime involved. An internal division, with expertise in finance and criminal justice, can be established to filter high-risk targets by information collection and analysis, then to investigate and evaluate for real-time crime detection.

參考文獻


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被引用紀錄


劉威宏(2015)。對企業舞弊之私人舉發制度-以吹哨者保護法為中心〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2015.02327
蔡杰承(2014)。論商業判斷法則於經濟犯罪中之作用—以證券交易法之非常規交易罪及特殊背信侵占罪為中心〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2014.02588
劉定坤(2013)。論境外天堂對公司治理的影響—以租稅政策與資訊隱密為中心〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2013.02631

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