- 學位論文
由若干阿根廷仲裁案論國際投資仲裁判斷及其不一致之解決
Solutions to the Inconsistency of Awards for International Investment Arbitration – Reflections from ICSID Awards against the Argentine Republic
摘要
世界貿易組織(the World Trade Organization；WTO)在杜哈回合後陷入談判僵局，開發中與已開發國家對於諸多議題無法達成共識，而使多邊貿易談判陷入停滯狀態。有鑑於此，在多邊貿易談判進展未見曙光之前，許多國家開始積極尋找洽簽自由貿易協定(Free Trade Agreements；FTAs)或雙邊投資協定(Bilateral Investment Treaties；BITs)的機會，以期維持甚至促進一國的經濟發展。 在越來越多FTAs或BITs被簽定的同時，國際投資仲裁糾紛的數目也日益增加。然而，國際投資法這個法領域的發展其實在1990年代以前幾乎是空白的狀態，以致於國際投資仲裁庭的仲裁人在對於相關法律的適用與解釋並無一致的看法，而在某程度形成各執一詞的情形。 此外，國際投資仲裁的審理上多採特設(ad hoc)仲裁庭模式，而且彼此的判斷互不影響，且無上訴機制的檢驗。因此，很有可能造成具類似甚至相同背景事實的案件，卻可能由不同的仲裁庭推導出不同的判斷結果。實際上，也的確發生過這一類的問題。近來，一連串與阿根廷有關之仲裁案即為明證。 阿根廷為因應其2001年所面臨的經濟危機，採行了一連串的行政措施，導致不少的外國投資人損失慘重。也因此，阿根廷搖身一變成為國際投資爭端解決中心(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes；ICSID)的最大戶被告。然而，因為阿根廷的國際投資仲裁案件多由臨時仲裁庭處理，且沒有上訴機制來解決法律適用與解釋的爭議，使得背景事實基本上是一模一樣的案件，同樣的雙邊投資協定(US-Argentina BIT)，卻僅因為由不同仲裁庭的仲裁人審理，致使判斷結果南轅北轍，暴露出國際投資爭端體系的風險也是弱點，而弱化了相關機構與判斷的權威性與正當性。 有鑒於國際投資仲裁之判斷一致有其重要性，要求以ICSID為首的仲裁機構進行國際投資仲裁相關改革的建制，而成立國際投資仲裁的上訴機構獲得不少的擁護者，論者以為如此以來可大大提升國際投資仲裁判斷的一致性與可預測性。然而，不管是將上訴機構納入WTO底下、增加於ICSID體系中，或者是創設最高投資法院或新增入國際法院中，都需要透過會員國至少多數的同意始能通過。在一個爭議性仍極高的問題，強大的政治支持是必須的。不管是從目前開發中國家與已開發國家對於杜哈回合的僵局仍持續進行，或是學界自己對於上訴機構建立的正反意見都有且支持人數差不多的情況下，上訴機構最大的程序問題就是在有無機會透過公約或協定「誕生」的問題。本文以為從目前的國際政治氣氛，上訴機構能被建立的機會實在不大。即使程序問題不存在，從實體面觀察，上訴機構的設立仍需要大量的人力與預算經費。然而，是否有足夠的人力以及預算還是一大問題。即使有足夠人力，經費要如何產生？開發中國家更不想多付任何錢。若此，是否亦連帶影響到程序上建立的問題？此外，有足夠的人力並不代表品質的確保。是否有足夠數量的仲裁人能勝任於國際投資仲裁體系中，進而強化仲裁判斷一致性，也尚有疑問。再者，仲裁判斷之一致性是否確實能因上訴機構的建制而有明顯改善仍屬未知，且延長的仲裁程序對投資人的影響實為弊大於利，上訴機構之建制如何回應這些問題當屬其面臨之一大挑戰。 因此，本文以為在程序問題不大可能成功，且實體問題亦然之情況下，或許試圖從體制內改革為一較佳之方法。本文以為對於體制內的改革，或許有幾項辦法值得參考，亦即仲裁庭對於邊際裁量原則的運用來平衡投資人權利與公共利益、擴大ICSID公約第52條之解釋與適用、提升判斷透明性、改善仲裁人資格、合併案件，以及制度性的幫助開發中國家於國際投資仲裁中的相關準備與訓練。 若上述的措施能被確實落實，應可有效地提升國際投資仲裁判斷的一致性與可預測性，從而提升仲裁機構與判斷的正當性與權威性，並吸引更多國家的參與與加入，來達實現日後國際投資體系多邊化的可能。
並列摘要
The World Trade Organization (WTO) has been in a stalemate ever since Doha Round. Developing countries and developed countries cannot reach a consensus on many issues. Given it is still difficult to see the light from the end of the tunnel, many countries actively started looking for opportunities to sign the Free Trade Agreement (FTAs) or Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) in order to promote their economic growth and development. With more and more FTAs and BITs being signed, the number of international investment disputes has been increasing at the same time. However, the development of the legal field of international investment law is basically blank before the 1990s, and thus, arbitrators at the international investment arbitration tribunal have their own ideas concerning application and interpretation of related laws. In addition, most tribunals are ad hoc, and there is no precedent and appellate system in international law. Therefore, it is likely that cases which share similar if not the same circumstances, may lead to different judgments by different tribunals. This situation did happen in reality. Recent arbitration awards against the Argentine Republic are clear examples of this. Argentina adopted a series of administrative measures in order to deal with the economic crisis in 2001, and investors suffered greatly. Consequently, Argentina became the member State which receives the most complaints by investors at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Because most arbitrations were handled by ad hoc tribunals, and there was no appellate mechanism to solve the disputes concerning application and interpretation of international investment law, outcomes of arbitral awards differ significantly even though the fact is identical, the legal source or the cited treaty is the same, and only the arbitrators are different. This shows the risk and also the weakness of the international investment dispute system, and weakens related institutions’ authority and legitimacy. Keeping in mind that the importance of inconsistency of arbitral awards in international investment, voices have been raised demanding that the arbitration institutions be reformed, particularly the ICSID given its influence in international investment law. Quite a few people support the idea of establishing appellate mechanism in the system of international investment arbitration. Supporters argue that such a mechanism will thus increase awards’ consistency and predictability. However, to include the appellate body into the WTO, to add into the ICSID system, or to create a Supreme Investment Court (SIC), or to add another chamber under the International Court of Justice (ICJ), requires consent by at least half of the member States. It is necessary to acquire strong political will to deal with a highly controversial issue. However, be it the on-going stalemate between developing and developed countries over Doha Round, or the on-going debates in the academic world, it seems rather difficult to establish the appellate mechanism. In addition, even if it is possible to acquire most countries’ support to create the appellate mechanism, where would the funding come from? Is there enough qualified manpower? What about the prolonged arbitral process that investors have to endure? Therefore, the author believes that is it more practical to first reform within the international investment arbitration system. The author suggests several methods, including the introduction of margin of appreciation doctrine into the arbitral process, expanding the interpretation and application of Article 52 of the ICSID Convention, enhancing transparency of arbitral process, improving the qualification required for arbitrators, consolidating cases with identical facts and issues, and assisting and training developing countries for the international investment arbitration preparations. If the abovementioned measures can be implemented, the author believes that consistency and predictability of arbitral awards in international investment can be effectively enhanced, legitimacy of arbitral awards and authorities of investment arbitration institutions can consequently be enhanced. Such a change may attract more countries to join the system, and realize the possibility of the multilateraliazation of the international investment system.