當代英美法理學的重要發展之一在於,對法理學方法論的高度興趣。英語世界中最主要的法理學家如哈特、德沃金、Joseph Raz及John Finnis等巨擘都對此發展做出了貢獻。 本文試圖以Raz的法哲學論述與取徑作為線索,來探討英語世界法理學核心學群──亦即哈特所開展的一般法理學或分析法理學──中關於法理學方法論或後設理論問題的討論。Raz在上個世紀八〇年代迄今的方法論論述,提示了當代英語世界中法理學方法論主流的核心看法,並由許多主要的法理學家所共享。此一方法論路線更被認為是法理學方法論的通說。 本文第二章首先聚焦於Raz對法規範性問題的探討,並以哈特晚年與Raz關於法律陳述與法規範性等問題的辯論為線索,討論並比較哈特與Raz對法律及其規範性的理論化說明。本章尤其著重於理解,哈特與Raz的法哲學分別為法律及其規範性提出超然說明。哈特或是Raz的法理論超然路線,反映於法理學方法論層面的相關思考,第三章著眼於Dickson對Raz方法論路線的詳盡開展,以討論「後〈後記〉」方法論論述中的評價之於法理論的關係。第四章則關注Raz晚近對法理學方法論或後設理論的論述,本文並試圖在一般法理學以及Raz重要論敵如Robert Alexy、Eugenio Bulygin以及德沃金之回應中,進一步脈絡化Raz論述並指出所涉及爭點與方法論意義。第五章簡要勾勒一般法理學的提問與方法論特徵,並指出「概念先行」是一般法理學�描述性法理學�分析法理學的方法論核心。並進一步討論對一般法理學�分析法理學�描述性法理學之方法論質疑乃至於另類捍衛路線。最後則是結論。
In the last three decades or so there is high Interest in the Methodology of Jurisprudence or legal theory flourishing in the contemporary Anglophone jurisprudence. The most important Legal Philosophers such as H. L. A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin, Joseph Raz and John Finnis and many other legal theorists have contributed to this development. This Essay attempts to take Raz’s legal philosophy as a clue to discussions on the methodological or meta-theoretical issues in the the dominant jurisprudential community of the world--the General Jurisprudence or Analytic Jurisprudence set out by Hart. Raz‘s approach to the methodology which has be offered in the 80’ of last century, have been shared by many leading legal theorists and therefore has been considered as the Orthodox View of jurisprudential methodology. Chapter 2 first focuses on Raz on the normativity of law, and try to compare the theorectical accounts of law and its normativity of Hart and of Raz in the light of Hart’s Debate in his late life with Raz over the legal statements and legal obligation. As Andrei Marmor has said, Hart and Raz's philosophy of law are detached account of law. Hart's theory of law or Raz detached thoery reflect in the jurisprudence of the relevant methodological lines of thinking. Chapter 3 pays attention to Dickson’s detailed explication of Raz’s methodology—named by Dickson as ”indirectly evaluative legal theory”-- and discuss "post-Postscript" methodological Debates over the role of evaluation in the legal theory. Chapter 4 is concerned with the Raz’s methodological essay “Can The Be a Theory of Law?” which were pulished in 2005, in which Raz tried to justify the general theory of law and point out that the main task of legal theory is to offer and account of the nature of law rather than the concept of law. I try to contextualize Raz’s views in this essay within the responses from his important opponents such as Robert Alexy, Eugenio Bulygin and Ronald Dworkin, and within the further discussion of General Jurisprudence. In chapter 5 I try to characterize the features of the questions-raising and the methodologicay of the General Jurisprudence, as many theorists and I call it the "priority of conceptual question." And I try to discuss the approaches against General Jurisprudence from Brian Leiter’s naturalized jurisprudence and from Danny Priel’s view against the Orthodox View. In addition, I try to analyze the alternative approach to defend the General Jurisprudence/Descriptive Jurisprudence/Analytic Jurisprudence, including the so-called “normative positivism” and the “pluralistic Methodology” adopted by Jules Coleman. Finally, Chapter 6 is the concluding remark.