以投機性交易成本分析探討公私合夥治理之適用性評估與契約變更原則

Opportunism Focused Transaction Cost Analysis of Public-Private Partnership's Suitability Evaluation and Contract Modification Rules

崔君瑋(Chun-Wei TSUI)

指導教授 ： 荷世平

國立臺灣大學/工學院/土木工程學研究所/博士(2015年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2015.10904

摘要

公私部門合夥推動基礎建設專案(公私合夥模式)的關鍵優勢在於：有效整合資源、提升經營效率。然而，其潛在的交易成本及無效率，經常受到低估、甚至忽略，導致公私合夥模式被誤用於不適合的專案，最終可能造成專案的失敗。本研究從交易成本經濟學的角度，分析在什麼情況、什麼原因下，公私合夥模式會變成一種高成本的專案治理架構。此外，本研究並研究專案的需求風險問題，分析在履約階段的契約變更原則，探討在哪一種法律原則下，需求風險所帶來的交易成本能夠被降至最低。具體來說，本研究以交易成本經濟學為基礎，提出公私合夥模式之治理架構理論。此項理論主張，有三類潛藏於公私合夥模式中的重要投機問題，可能造成重大的交易成本，並使公私合夥模式成為高成本的專案治理架構。這三類重要的投機問題包括：控制股東與少數股東間之利益衝突(principal-principal problem)、廠商主導的箝制問題(firm hold-up problem)、及政府主導的箝制問題(government-led hold-up problem)。其次，本研究也指出造成上述投機問題的專案性特徵及制度性特徵。根據這些特徵，本研究提出投機性交易成本之分析架構，輔助實務上評估公私合夥模式之可行性分析。再就事後的角度分析，對於採行公私合夥模式的專案，需求風險是影響專案成敗的關鍵因素之一。倘若營運期間的實際需求與特許契約簽約時的預測不相符合，可能造成專案的營收不足，或者特許公司獲得超額利潤，導致增加民間投資人的風險貼水、政府的政治成本及專案整體的交易成本。就此相關問題，本研究分析其適用之特許權變更原則，檢驗各不同法律原則的效率性，並依據需求風險的高低，提出較有效率的法律原則。此外，本研究採取個案研究法，作為理論發展的一部分，並據以評估本研究所提出之理論，及闡釋該理論於實務上之運用方式。

關鍵字

公私合夥模式 ； 專案治理架構 ； 控制股東與少數股東利益衝突 ； 箝制問題 ； 重啟談判 ； 契約變更 ； 交易成本經濟學 ； 法律經濟分析

並列摘要

While the higher efficiency due to better pooling of resources is greatly emphasized in public-private partnerships (PPPs) for infrastructure projects, the embedded transaction inefficiencies are often understated or even ignored. As a result, PPPs can be misused for unsuitable projects, and failure of the projects may thus be expected. Through the lens of transaction cost economics (TCE), this study aims to answer why and when PPPs may become a costly project governance structure. Furthermore, this research studies issues on the project demand risk. It analyzes various contract modification principles applied during the stage of contract performance, and identifies the legal rules under which the transaction costs arising out of demand risk may be efficiently minimized. Specifically, this study develops a TCE-based theory of PPPs as a governance structure. This theory suggests that three major opportunism problems embedded in infrastructure PPPs are possible to cause substantial transaction costs and render PPPs a costly governance structure. The three main opportunism problems are principal-principal problem, firm’s hold-up problem, and government-led hold-up problem. In addition, project and institutional characteristics that may lead to opportunism problems are identified. Based on these characteristics, an opportunism-focused transaction cost analysis (OTCA) of PPPs as a governance structure is proposed to supplement the current practice of PPP feasibility analysis. Furthermore, from the perspective of ex post management the demand risk can be one of the critical elements of PPP project success. If the actual demand during the project operation comes out to be less than the initial prediction, the resulting shortfalls in operating revenues may cause private promoters to request high risk premiums for future investment in PPP projects. On the other side, if the actual demand comes out to be higher than the initial prediction, excess profits that the concession company may earn from the project can impose political costs on the government. This study analyzes the applicable contract modification principles addressing the related problems of demand risk, and identifies the legal rules that may efficiently minimize the total transaction costs. In addition, as a part of theory development, this study uses case analysis to evaluate the proposed theory and to illustrate how the proposed OTCA can be applied in practice. Policies and administration strategies for infrastructure PPPs are derived based on the proposed theory.

並列關鍵字

Public-Private Partnerships ； Governance Structure ； Principal-Principal Problem ； Hold-up Problem ； Renegotiation ； Contract Modification ； Transaction Cost Economics ； Law and Economics Analysis

參考文獻

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