戰後台灣地下黨的革命鬥爭（1945-1955）

本文以鬥爭政治理論與策略行動場域理論為分析架構，以敘事解釋為方法，通過將歷史鬥爭中的各方行動者看成彼此相繫的「網」來分析互動，以及將社會系統視為涵蓋國際政治－國家－次級國家場域－非國家場域的分層架構，解釋二戰結束後台灣島上由國民黨政權推動的國家建構、內戰、及中共地下黨台灣省工作委員會的革命鬥爭的興衰過程。本研究的謎題是：在戰後初期（1945-1949）的情境中，當前殖民母國、國際、及台灣社會都提供有利於新政權進行國家建構的條件時，為何國府建立的地方政府未能迅速完成國家建構並穩定統治，反而引起兩波全島性、且日益激進的大型鬥爭，即1947年的「二二八」與隨後蓬勃的共黨革命？在第二章到第四章，我指出戰後國府在台灣建立的省級政府，如何源於「內戰」影響而無法在種種有利條件支持下迅速完成國家建構，反而造成一組國家能力與國家自主性低落，唯有民主化程度相對較高的政體。這組省級政府由於無法與大量非國家場域迅速建立穩定聯繫，導致國家與社會關係中的矛盾迅速滋生。另一方面，政權性質也形塑了台人的政治參與路徑，以投入選舉與體制內改革為主流路線。而1947年2月底爆發的「二二八」事件，即在此路線上重構為兩條鬥爭路徑──政治菁英主導的「處理委員會」與非政治菁英主導的「自治（武裝）路線」。我也指出中共於1946年建立的台灣地下黨同樣具有人力與資源匱乏的「邊陲性」，一直到軍事鎮壓後，才逐漸在省府「懷柔」政策的間隙與台人激進化等條件下擴大動員，並於1948年夏天重構了對於台灣社會性質的評估與整體戰略。自第五到第十章，我依序檢視了共黨於高等與中等教育場域（第五、六章）、國營產業場域與工匠場域（第七、第八章）、農業場域（第九章）、山地行政場域（第十章）的動員過程。我細緻檢視了各場域內國、共雙方的競爭，並指出無論就政治認同、鬥爭訴求與形式上，不同場域呈現出相對多重的動員與鬥爭軌跡。第十一章檢視了地下黨為何失敗。除了先行研究強調的「冷戰」與1950年後國府在台重構等因素外，我指出必須注意地下黨於1948年底基於對局勢樂觀而決定降低隱蔽性與加速動員的抉擇，及中央情治單位開始引入針對地下黨的訊問技術，也成為瓦解地下鬥爭的關鍵。這使得地下黨於1950年初「雪崩」般地瓦解。至於殘存的兩處據點──桃竹苗的農村據點與台北盆地的鹿窟武裝基地，也於1952年到1955年間陸續為特務肅清。在結論中，我除了回顧本研究的整體發現，也回應社會學界對於戰後初期的國家性質、國家社會關係、鬥爭政治史的既有論點，指出值得重估或探索的新方向。

關鍵字

國家建構；鬥爭政治；策略行動場域；地下先鋒黨；白色恐怖；革命；敘事解釋

並列摘要

This dissertation analyzes the development of events happened on the island of Taiwan after August 1945, the end of second World War, along three lines: firstly, the state-building propelled by the KuoMinTang regime; secondly, the civil war; and thirdly, the rise, struggle, and downfall of the Chinese Communist Party underground organization committee. In terms of analytical structure, this dissertation is based on the contentious politics theory and strategic-action field theory. In terms of methodology, this dissertation employs narrative explanation in historical sociology, considering the various actors within historical struggles as part of a ‘network’ that are closely connected to each other in order to observe their interaction, and at the same time viewing the social system as an overarching tiered structure that covers international, state, sub-state, and non-state fields. The research question of this dissertation asks why, in the context of early post-war Taiwan (1945-1949), as there seemed to be favourable factors in the colonial mother state, international politics and Taiwanese society itself for the state-building by the new regime, the KuoMinTang regime failed to establish quickly the state-building and political order but sparked off two waves of major struggles that involved the whole of the island and radicalised through time-- the February 28 Incident in 1947 and the following vigorous communist revolution. In Chapters 2 to 4, I discuss how due to the impact of ‘the civil war’ the provincial government instituted in Taiwan by the KuoMinTang regime was not able to achieve the state-building despite the favourable factors in the context, but rather gave rise to an administration of limited political power and autonomy, albeit being relatively democratic. This provincial government was not able to establish quickly a stable connection with a large amount of non-national fields, which then led to the fast growth of conflicts within state-society relationships. On the other hand, the nature of this administration also shaped a particular trajectory of political involvement for Taiwanese people, which had a strong focus on electoral campaigns and internal system reforms. Based on this structure, the February 28 Incident in 1947 re-established two trajectories for the following struggles-- the settlement committees led by political elites and the autonomous (armed) trajectory taken by the political non-elites. I also point out that the underground party fostered by the Chinese communist party in 1946 in Taiwan possessed a similar marginality: with extreme deficiencies of manpower and resources, it was not able to expand its mobilization until after military suppressions by the government, when a gap of conciliation policy of the KuoMinTang regime and the radicalization of the Taiwanese people offered a chance, and it re-evaluated the nature of the Taiwanese society and its overall strategy in the summer of 1948. In Chapters 5 to 10, I examine how the communist party mobilized people in various fields: within the fields of higher and secondary education (Chapters 5 and 6), within fields of national industries and their workers (Chapters 7 and 8), within fields of agricultural industries (Chapter 9), and within the fields of administration of the aboriginals (Chapter 10). I investigate in detail the competition between KuoMinTang regime and the communist party in each field and point out that all the fields present relatively diverse trajectories of development in terms of the political identification of the participants and the appeals and formats of their struggles. In addition to factors pointed out by previous scholarship, such as the ‘cold-war’ and the re-establishment of the administration after 1950, I also highlight the party’s choice of a more explicit and speedy mobilization at the end of 1948 due to an optimistic estimation of the circumstances, which in turn became the key to its ‘avalanche’ collapse in early 1950. Its remaining two strongholds-- the villages in Taoyuan, Hsinchu and Miaoli and the Luku armed base in the Taipei basin-- were also purged successively by the secret services during 1952 and 1955. In the Conclusion, I summarise the overall results of this investigation, and respond to existing sociological scholarship on the topics concerning the nature of the state, the state-society relations and the history of contentious politics in the post-war period, with the hope of identifying directions for further re-evaluation or exploration.