反對道德理由的普遍性：一個從值得譴責談起的論證

Against the Universality of Moral Reason: An Argument from Blameworthiness

林祐任(Yu-Jen Lin)

指導教授 ： 王榮麟

國立臺灣大學/文學院/哲學研究所/碩士(2018年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201804031

摘要

道德理由的普遍性是康德倫理學的核心主張之一，道德理由的普遍性指的是：如果一個行動是道德上錯的，則對每個行動者而言以及在每個相似的情況下，存在一個初步的規範理由不去做這個行動。Bernard Williams的理由內在論是挑戰道德理由的普遍性最強而有力的論證之一，然而，單就道德理由而言，Williams的論證是不完整的，因為沒有討論到道德理由獨特的人際面向。在這篇論文中，我會嘗試掌握道德理由的人際面向，同時保有Williams理由內在論的精神。
在第一章中，我會簡單的整理出Williams論證的標準詮釋，以及Stephen Finlay所給出的另類詮釋，後者可能是Williams論證最有說服力的版本，但是並不討論何者才是Williams真正的論證，在第一章結尾，我也會對這些論證提出抱怨。在第二章中，我會給出我自己論證的兩個論點，第一個論點是一個概念真理：如果對行動者A來說存在一個道德理由不去做φ，那麼行動者A做φ的行動是值得譴責的。第二個論點是關於證成的優先性，只有行動不是值得譴責的這個事實，可以證成沒有道德理由不去做這個行動，換句話說，譴責是否是適當的不取決於理由的存在，反之，譴責有自己一套獨立於理由概念的內在標準，我的第二個論點來自於P. F. Strawson的反應態度和道德責任的理論。在最後一章中，我會討論譴責的情有可原條件和豁免條件，分別顯示了行動者在某些情況下以及對某些行動者來說譴責是不適當的，情有可原條件包括了出於過錯、無知、意外或壓力等條件，豁免條件包含Robert Harris和精神病態這兩種類型的條件，這些條件可能使得道德上錯誤的行為在某些情況或對於某些行動者而言沒有理由不去做，由此可知，道德理由的普遍性不成立。

關鍵字

定言令式 ； 內在理由 ； 譴責 ； 反應態度 ； 情有可原條件 ； 豁免條件 ； 精神病態

並列摘要

The universality of moral reason is one of the central theses of Kantian ethics. Universality is that if an action is morally wrong, there is a pro tanto normative reason not to do it for every rational agent in every similar situation. Bernard Williams’ thesis of internal reason is one of the most influential arguments that has challenged the universality of moral reason. However, Williams’ own argument is incomplete as far as moral reason is concerned. The interpersonal aspect, which functions as a distinctive aspect of moral reason, is missed. In this paper, I try to preserve the interpersonal aspect while keeping the spirit of Williams’ internal reason.
In the first chapter, I will only give a sketch of the standard as well as the alternative interpretation given by Stephen Finlay, which may be the most convincing argument offered by Williams, while not be bothered by which interpretation is the most correct one. I will make several complaints about Williams’ arguments at the end of this chapter. In the second chapter, I will start my own argument with two points. My first point is a conceptual truth: if there is a moral reason for the agent A not to do φ, the agent A’s action φ is blameworthy. The second point is about the priority of justification. Only the fact that an action is not blameworthy can justify the fact that there is no moral reason not to do it. Whether the blame is appropriate does not rely on the existence of the reason. Rather, there are internal criteria for blame which are independent of reason. My second point is based on P. F. Strawson’s theory of reactive attitudes and moral responsibility. In the final chapter, I will explore the excusing and exempting conditions of blame, which shows that blame is inappropriate in certain situations or for certain agents. The former contains the conditions of the conditions of mistake, ignorance, accident or under stress. The latter includes the case of Robert Harris and psychopath. These conditions open up the possibilities that there are morally wrong actions without reasons not to do either for some agents or in certain situations. Therefore, the universality of moral reason is rejected.

並列關鍵字

categorical imperative ； internal reason ； blame ； reactive attitude ； the excusing condition ； the exempting condition ； psychopath

參考文獻

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Cleckley, Hervey. The Mask of Sanity: An Attempt to Clarify Some Issues About the So-Called Psychopathic Personality. St. Louis: The C.V. Mosby Company, 1955.

Coates, D. J. and N. A. Tognazzini. “The Contours of Blame.” In Blame: Its Nature and Norms. Edited by Coates, D. J. and N. A. Tognazzini. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Coates, D. J. and N. A. Tognazzini. “Blame.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition). Edited by Edward N. Zalta. URL = .