重尋盟友：趙宋君臣對故遼勢力的討論與招納 (1126-1164)

西元1126年，金人出兵攻宋。北宋欽宗至南宋孝宗之際，君臣為了抗金，他們注意到金國內外的故遼勢力，並提出多種利用之策。概括而論，這些對策大略可分為扶植尚存的遼朝宗室與重臣、聯合西遼、招納故遼屬民為軍等。而除了招納外，大多對策未有實踐，只是淪為宋人的空談，因此也為後世學者忽視。但是這些的對策出現，揭示時人是如何看待對金的戰爭，反映宋代特殊的軍事、對外交往思維，因此值得更多的關注。在遼朝已亡的情況下，宋人為什麼認為對策可行，甚至為此展開討論？為了回答這一問題，本論文整理兩宋之時，不同人對故遼勢力的討論，並注意他們提出哪些利用之策。接著立足軍事情報的傳遞、夷夏觀念、和戰氛圍等三個層面，追問這些對策為什麼出現，以此可見在兩宋官民在制定對外策略上，具有某些特殊的考量。　　通過本文的整理，可見扶植與聯合等主張於內涵上相似。追溯它們的提出，徽宗北伐前，已有人建議扶植將亡的遼朝，以此作為取代北伐的對策，這些意見在當時卻難受重視。之後金軍南下攻宋，宋欽宗君臣轉而提出復遼抗金。這一對策的提出，背後有金使教唆的影響，也有時人對燕雲人政治認同的揣想。欽宗的復遼最終失敗，這一行動更激怒金人二次南下，北宋滅亡。後世稱為「靖康之難」。到了南宋的高、孝之時，宋人基本上再難與遼人建立聯繫，但是官員卻仍注意著遼人，並講述類似的對策。鑽研這些言論，可見自徽宗到孝宗朝，即便面對不同的政治、軍事、國際環境，不同身份的宋人卻對遼人抱有同質性的想像。這些想像既受到過往與遼互動經驗的影響，也有宋人對外族與燕雲漢人的成見。概括來看，南宋的官員少有意願或能力實踐這些對策，但他們透過想像中的故遼勢力，以此辯駁和戰與否。一些官員藉由假定遼朝的再興，強調金人可破。這些說法的出現，反映宋金交戰以來，南宋主戰派的困境，他們難以為對金戰爭，提出有效的善後。　　扶植、聯合故遼等策的提出，顯示宋人在面對金朝威脅下，正重新評價過去的對手，這一傾向似乎也見諸其它環節，如南宋將帥招納遼人抗金一事。一些官員在思考如何執行招納時，也會出現與聯合、扶植對策共享的觀點，他們強調遼人並非宋朝之敵。不過就整體招納的執行來看，仍只有少數將帥將遼人視作盟友，大多數官員仍對他們抱有警惕。

關鍵字

澶淵之盟；夷夏觀念；想像；故遼再興；政治論述；軍事史

並列摘要

After 1126, The Jurchen started several wars with the Song dynasty. In order to fight against the Jurchen, people with diverse backgrounds, status and experiences in the Song dynasty noticed Khitan (Liao) forces and proposed various strategies to utilize Khitan forces to defeat the Jurchen. Those strategies can be roughly categorized into three types: first, support the Khitan royal family members, noble and important ministers; second, ally with Qara Khitai; third, recruit Khitan (Liao)′s subject peoples, including Khitans (契丹人), Bohae (渤海人), Xi (奚人) and Yan-Yun Hans (燕雲漢兒). Most of the strategies were not even practiced, so they were ignored by modern scholars. However, Song people’s proposal of the strategies demonstrated how they thought war with Jurchen, and reflected their idea of military and external relation, it deserves more attention. After the Fall of the Khitan (Liao) dynasty, why did the different emperors, literati and frontier officers in the two Song dynasties recognize those strategies as plausible, and even start a discussion about them? This thesis focuses on the discourse of how the two Song dynasties wanted to utilize Khitan (Liao) forces to fight against the Jurchen. Based on the transmission of military reports, the “concept of Hua-Yi distinction” (夷夏觀念) and the “atmosphere of war and compromise” (和戰氛圍), I make an attempt to inquire as to why those strategies were ‘invented’. 　　In regard to the use of the Khitan (Liao), before the Song under Emperor Huizong went northward to fight the Liao, some people criticized the expedition and suggested that the Khitan dynasty should be supported. However, their suggestions were neglected at that time. When the Jurchen entered into war with the Song regime, Emperor Qinzong and his officials decided to try and rebuild Khitan (Liao) regime to overthrow Jurchen. This was instigated by the Khitan and Yan-Yun Hans ambassadors who represented the Jurchen regime, and also involved the people’s imagination of the political identity of the Yan-Yun Hans. However, Khitan (Liao) rebuilding plan finally failed and led to Jingkang Incident. (靖康之難) Under the rule of the Gaozong Emperor and the first two years of the Xiaozong Emperor, it was difficult for the Song regime to establish contact with the Khitan (Liao) people. However, the officials were still interested in Khitan’s revival, a concept which would make Khitan become their ally and puppet. This concept encouraged them to propose relevant strategies. Those cases show that from the Northern Song until the Southern Song period, when confronting different political, military and diplomatic situations, people with different backgrounds in the Song regime shared comparable and homogeneous imaginations of Khitan (Liao) forces. The imaginations were based on the past experience of interacting with the Liao under the Chanyuan treaty and traditional concept of Tianxia and Hua-Yi distinction. To sum up, officials in the Southern Song lacked the intention or capability to implement these strategies. Resorting to the unreal imaginations of Khitan revival, officials depicted the Jurchen regime as a fragile enemy, so emperors should insist on fighting with the Jurchen. The appearing statements also show the dilemma of the hawkish Southern Song regime. It is difficult for them to organize reliable and efficient plans to reclaim territories and subject the people of the Northern Song. 　　The idea of supporting or allying with Qara Khitai shows that the Song people were re-evaluating their past opponents under the threat of the Jin Dynasty. If we would like to know whether this idea could also be seen in other strategies, we can observe that the Song regime recruited Khitan forces to fight with the Jurden. The perspective of not viewing the Khitan people as an enemy of the Song dynasty could also be seen when the officials were conceiving the implemented recruitment. However, by observing the implementation of the recruitment, we can only see a few frontier officers considered the Khitan (Liao) people as allies, while most officials still stayed vigilant to them.