政府股權與盡職治理對會計盈餘資訊內涵之影響

政府近年來積極推動公司治理改革，並於2016年發布「機構投資人盡職治理守則」，以期結合公司內外力量共同提升公司治理水準。本研究主要目的係探討政府身為具有專業資源的機構投資人，又兼具政策公權力與被投資企業股東雙重角色，是否藉由股權投資及其董監代表落實機構投資人盡職治理，提升被投資企業會計盈餘資訊內涵。研究結果發現政策導入後，全體上市公司會計盈餘資訊內涵下降，無法支持政策有效性。政府持股比率與盈餘資訊內涵呈現倒 U 型非線性關係，代表政府在持股轉折點後之過度投資，將對盈餘資訊內涵產生負面影響。至於政府控制股東身分與派任董監事代表對會計盈餘資訊內涵則無顯著的影響。

關鍵字

機構投資人；盡職治理守則；政府持股；會計盈餘資訊內涵；公司治理

並列摘要

In recent years, the government has promoted the implementation of various regulations and policies, for example, the 2016 Taiwan Stewardship Code, to combine both investee enterprises and institutional investors to enhance corporate governance standards. Owing to the dual role for government as public authority and a shareholder in investee enterprises, the government has more accessible resources to exercise than other investors. This study aims to examine whether government ownership and the existence of government-controlled seats in board of directors perform the duty as stewardship in improving the informativeness of accounting earnings of investee firms. The empirical results show that the informativeness of accounting earnings of listing companies is decreasing after promulgating Stewardship Code. Our results also show that government ownership significantly impacts informativeness of accounting earnings following an inverted U-shape pattern. Beyond that optimal level, informativeness of accounting earnings declined with increasing ownership. However, we find that the existence of government-controlled seats in board of directors and government as a major shareholder are not related to informativeness of accounting earnings.