本研究以2003-2005年上市公司之數據代表股權分置改革前樣本,以2006-2008年數據代表改革後樣本,探討中國績效表現落後之公司發放現金股利之因素。本研究由現金侵占的角度出發,定義非流通股股東現金股利侵占變數,探討非流通股股東與流通股股東是否對於同股不同價的情形越嚴重的中國上市公司,越容易造成非流通股控股股東具有侵占公司現金的動機。此外,本研究亦探討其他可能影響中國上市公司現金股利支付率的因素,包含資金侵占、是否為國有股以及自由現金流量,並且關注股權分置改革前與改革後,影響上市公司發放現金股利的因素是否出現差異。 以兩樣本t檢定與迴歸模型之實證結果發現,對於中國績效表現落後之公司,無論股權分置改革前或改革後,都存在控股股東透過支付現金股利侵占公司現金的情況,且自由現金流量較高的公司並未支付較多現金股利。
In order to explore the issue of why poorly performing Chinese companies pay cash dividends, we use the financial data of Chinese listed companies from 2003 through 2005 to represent the prior non-tradable shares reform sample, and use the data from 2006 through 2008 to represent the post-reform sample. From the perspective of cash expropriation, we defined the variables of cash dividends expropriation from shareholders of non-tradable shares. We intend to test if the larger the price differences between tradable and non-tradable shares for a single underperformed company, the stronger the motive of cash expropriation for shareholders of non-tradable shares will have. Besides, we also discuss other factors which may influence Chinese underperformed companies’ cash dividend payout ratios, including resource predation, state-owned shares and free cash flow. Moreover, we concern that whether poorly performing Chinese companies changed their payout behaviors due to the reform of non-tradable shares. According to our two sample t-test and regression models, cash dividend is consistently an important channel for controlling non-tradable shareholders to expropriate cash from a company, no matter prior or post the reform. Moreover, underperformed Chinese companies which have higher free cash flows do not have higher cash dividend payout ratios.