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  • 學位論文

以通路商的角度對多家產品供應商設計兩部收費契約

Designing Two-Part Tariff Contracts for Product Suppliers from the Perspective of a Distributor

指導教授 : 周雍強

摘要


臺灣的實體通路商發展興盛,如:7-ELEVEN、燦坤3C、家樂福、新光三越等,皆為知名、高市佔率通路商,而品牌、產品必須倚靠這些通路商來達到良好的銷售與市佔率。相較於早期以產品供應商、製造商為訂定契約者的研究來說,產品供應商的高議價能力、產品利潤,逐漸轉移至通路商,直至供應商成為賽局的跟隨者,是臺灣目前的現況。因此本研究以通路商的角度,即通路商為契約的制定者、賽局的領導者,來訂定對產品供應商的兩部收費契約。 在產品供應商的製造技術相差不遠,或能快速跟進技術先驅者的時代,生活中各式各樣的商品、品牌林立。因此在眾多不同的產品、產品供應商之中,如何針對不同產品供應商,設計不同的最佳化契約,是本研究最欲探討的問題。研究模型考慮供應鏈中的兩端,一端為雙佔上游供應商,一供應商市佔率大、另一供應商則市佔率小;另一端為一獨占通路商。兩供應商皆想在此通路商販售己身產品以獲得產品市場上的優勢、知名度等。通路商考慮供應商之異同的兩大因素:(1) 供應商市佔率、(2) 產品差異性,發展以Stackelberg賽局模型,通路商為領導者的基礎最佳模型,以及以供應鏈利潤最大化、加入固定收費的集中式供應鏈模型。 最終根據模型結果,發展一制訂契約選擇之整體主要策略。策略ㄧ:針對市佔率較小之供應商,考慮其市佔率來訂定契約,其市佔率越高,通路商訂定營收抽成比率越高;相反的其市佔率越低,營收抽成比率就越低。策略二:針對市佔率較大之供應商,考慮產品差異性來訂定契約,產品差異性越高,通路商訂定營收抽成比率越高;產品差異性越低則訂定營收抽成比率越低。

並列摘要


Major distributors in Taiwan like 7-ELEVEN, TSANN KUEN 3C, Carrefour, and SHIN KONG MITSUKOSHI, have thriving. Products and brands have to count upon distributors to achieve a better goal of sale and larger market share. Comparing with earlier studies which focused on the perspective of product suppliers and manufacturers, studies in this generation could discuss more about the topics that distributors is more powerful, and the profit sharing of distributors might become more than product suppliers. Consequently, we set up the topic to design two-part tariff contracts between a distributor and its suppliers with a viewpoint of the distributor. To design contracts among multiple product suppliers is the central research question of this thesis. We consider a problem setting of a triadic supply chain with one distributor in downstream, and two product suppliers in the upstream. We postulate the market share of one supplier is bigger than the other, then construct the distributor-Stackelberg model named as the basic optimization model, with the distributor as the game leader. This research extends the model to a centralized supply chain regime model, which take the fixed fee as a way to draw the surplus revenue from the suppliers. According to the result of the model, we could formulate key strategies: (1) Considering the smaller market share supplier for drawing up the two-part tariff format contract. The market share factor and the per-unit fee are in the direct ratio. (2) Considering the larger market share supplier for drawing up the two-part tariff format contract. The product differentiation factor and the per unit fee are in the direct ratio too.

參考文獻


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被引用紀錄


王怡婷(2016)。通路商領導下的兩部收費合約規格制定〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201603539

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