管理者特質與公司現金政策

Managerial Characteristics and Corporate Cash Policies

葉家維(Chia-Wei Yeh)

指導教授 ： 何耕宇

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/財務金融學研究所/碩士(2014年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2014.02364

摘要

近年來，探討公司現金持有的文獻快速增長。然而，過去文獻均主要聚焦於不同的公司特性與公司現金持有之關係；鮮少有實證研究探討不同的管理者特質對公司現金持有的影響。本論文在文獻上的貢獻即在於考慮諸如年齡、任職期間、自信程度、教育程度等管理者特質如何影響公司現金決策。本研究發現當公司的高階經理人任職期間較長，或者當公司是由過度自信的高階經理人管理時，會傾向持有較多的現金。然而，當公司的高階經理人具有企業管理碩士學位時，會傾向持有較少的現金；高階經理人的年齡和公司現金持有之間的關係並不明確。此外，當公司是由過度自信的高階經理人管理時，持有現金的代理問題將較嚴重。進一步的實證分析發現，年齡較高的經理人與任期較長的經理人較可能基於預防性的動機而持有現金；過度自信的經理人保留大量現金的目的卻非如此；而當公司的高階經理人具有企管碩士學位時，公司較傾向將多餘的資金用於投資活動。總體而論，本論文為不同的管理者特質如何影響公司現金政策提供了完整的實證證據。

關鍵字

現金持有 ； 現金政策 ； 管理者特質 ； 管理者偏誤

並列摘要

There has been a surge of research on corporate cash holdings in recent years. While most previous studies mainly focus on the relation between firm characteristics and corporate cash policies, few empirical studies explore the effects of managerial characteristics on corporate cash holdings. We contribute the related literature by considering the managerial characteristics, such as age, tenure, confidence, and education, and conduct empirical tests to investigate their effects on corporate cash policies. We find that firms managed by CEOs with longer tenure and by overconfident CEOs tend to have higher levels of cash holdings. However, firms managed by CEOs with MBA degree tend to preserve less cash. Our study shows mixed evidence on the relation between the age of managers and corporate cash holdings. We also find that the agency problem of holding cash is more severe when firms are managed by overconfident CEOs. Further analyses suggest that senior and longer-tenured CEOs are more likely to hold cash for precautionary motives, but overconfident CEOs do not preserve cash for such reason. Furthermore, CEOs with MBA degree seem to invest more when their firms have excess cash. Overall, this dissertation provides a complete empirical evidence for the effects of managerial characteristics on corporate cash policies.

並列關鍵字

Cash holdings ； Cash policy ； Managerial characteristics ； Managerial biases

參考文獻

Barker, V. L., Mueller, G., 2002. CEO characteristics and firm R&D spending. Management Science 48, 782--801.

Bates, T. W., Kahle, K. M., Stulz, R. M., 2009. Why do U.S. firms hold so much more cash than they used to? Journal of Finance 64, 1985--2021.

Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., Ferrell, A., 2009. What matters in corporate governance? Review of Financial Studies 22, 783--827.

Ben-David, I., Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., 2013. Managerial miscalibration. Quarterly Journal of Economics 128, 1547--1584.

Bertrand, M., Schoar, A., 2003. Managing with style: The effect of managers on firm policies. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 1169--1208.