- 學位論文
二階層通路垂直控制：經銷商投機行為在品牌間競爭之分析
An Analysis of Vertical Control Policy in Two-Level Channel: Embedding Opportunism of Dealer in Inter-Brand Competition
若您是本文的作者，可授權文章由華藝線上圖書館中協助推廣。
摘要
在兩廠產品品質有差異的雙占市場，正廠產品定位為高品質高價格，副廠則為低品質低價格，兩廠作價格及品質的競爭。正廠的銷售通路為二階層通路（製造商、經銷商和零售商）中，製造商為了防止經銷商採取品牌內競爭行為，破壞企業形象或影響利潤，通常會採用垂直限制策略，如：轉售價格限制策略。然而，採用轉售價格限制策略消除品牌內競爭行為，往往忽略經銷商在市場還必須面對品牌間競爭，誘使它們採取自利決策導致製造商利潤損失。 本研究探討正廠製造商採取轉售價格限制策略無法控制經銷商的投機行為時，製造商採用「內隱控制策略」，預測經銷商行為，將經銷商投機行為納入其定價決策的策略效果。本文建構正廠內隱控制策略之數學模型，首先分析該策略通路內的控制效果，再分析正副廠競爭對該策略的影響。研究發現製造商採用內隱控制策略能訂定均衡的轉售價格，間接控制經銷商的投機行為，兩廠皆能達成最佳利潤。然而，當考慮品牌間競爭，則內隱控制策略不一定有效，經銷商的投機行為有可能使製造商獲利。控制效果受到製造商轉售價格限制策略分給下游的利潤分配比例影響：若製造商分配給經銷商較多利潤，經銷商投機的幅度較低且能防止正副廠品牌在雙占市場採取激烈的價格競爭，此時，放任經銷商採取投機行為能使製造商得到較佳的利益。
並列摘要
In the duopoly market, product quality of two firms is different. Price and quality of Name Brand products are higher, and price and quality of Generic Brand products are lower. Name Brand’s channel is two-level, including manufacturer, dealer and retailer. For preventing intra-brand competition in downstream from harming the corporate image or profit, the upstream manufacturer often uses the vertical restraint policy, like Resale Price Maintanence to control the behavior of dealers. However, while eliminating the disadvantage from intra-brand competition, dealers under inter-brand competition could speculate in opportunism. This thesis shows that upstream manufacturers in two-level channel can use “implicit control policy” to control dealer opportunism which RPM can not control when facing inter-brand price and quality competition. Manufacturers must predict dealer’s behavior and embed their opportunistic behavior in its pricing decision. The research develops a mathematical model of brand name’s implicit contorl policy, analyzing the policy’s effect in the channel at first, then considers the effect in inter-brand competition. The results show that manufacturers can make an equilibrium price and indirectly control dealer’s opportunism through “impilcit control policy.” But, results also show that the policy does not always work under inter-brand competition, dealer’s opportunism sometimes helps manufacturer gain more profit. The policy’s effect deppends on profit allocation by RPM : if manufacturers allocate more profit to dealers, dealers’ opportunism is smaller and dealers also prevent severe price competition between brands, manufacturers can make more profit by not controling dealers’ opportunism.
參考文獻
1.王志軒(2005)，「供應鏈中的水平競合模式與通路垂直關係之研究」，國立臺灣大學商學研究所博士論文，頁11-18
2.施映如(2007)，「三階層需求通路之垂直控制分析：轉售價格限制在品牌間競爭的效果」，國立臺灣大學工業工程研究所碩士論文，頁24-35。
2.Bergen, M., Dutta, S., & Walker, O.C. (1992), “Agency Relationships in Marketing: A Review of the Implications and Applications of Agency and Related Theories,” Journal of Marketing, Vol. 56(3), pp. 1-24.
3.Bernstein, F., & Federgruen, A. (2004), “A General Equilibrium Model for Industries with Price and Service Competition,” Operations Research, Vol. 52(6), pp. 868-886.
4.Bolton, P., & Bonanno, G. (1988), “Vertical Restraints in a Model of Vertical Differentiation,?耔he Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 103(3), pp. 555-570.