- 學位論文
論中共政權與新興資本家的關係
A Study of the “Guanxi” Between the PRC Regime and the Newly-Emerging Bourgeoisie Class
摘要
本文以關係討論中共政權對新興資產階級的控制。過去對資產階級與中共政權互動的討論，大約可分為受現代化理論影響的「民主樂觀說」，以及從現實演進出發的「威權穩定說」兩者。第一種民主樂觀說認為在資產階級逐漸變強的前提下，雙方相互競合對彼方的影響，因此資產階級不是目前正在侵蝕中共的統治，就是企圖於未來推翻威權政府；第二種威權穩定說則是認為在中共統治能力不斷提昇的前提下，懷疑資產階級能扮演的角色，他們若非認為中共控制或吸納了資產階級，就是推定雙方暫時互利合作。 以上論述皆隱含一個共同假設：中共政權與私營企業主雙方皆是獨立於彼此之外的個體，按照不同力量對比的邏輯展開競爭與合作。本文認為，區分了我與他群的不同，容易推論出兩群的對立或控制。但如果兩者實二而一，如此假設只會誤導我們找尋答案的方向。因此本文提出另一種假設：新興的資產階級其實脫胎於中共政權內部。並於第二章運用一個重要變數：關係的建構及發展來回答這個問題。在第三章我們是這樣論證的：首先是社會主義意識型態的獨尊之勢，造成了政治運動與計畫經濟體制橫掃一切資本主義因子，當然也包括被視為剝削者的資產階級。而在計畫經濟體制的缺憾下，關係成為社會中稀缺資源的配置制度，而掌控資源者，非共黨官僚莫屬。 經改開始後，資源的配置制度雖加入了市場的運作，但這個市場卻非西方理論家所想像的市場。我們有兩個面向的觀察：第一是如何創業，其次則是如何經營以面對商業競爭及政治(政策)壓力的問題。在創業方面，經濟學教科書告訴我們，土地、勞力、資本乃是市場經濟生產產品的關鍵，而經改初期一般平民根本沒有這三個要素，如何完成初步的資本累積成為所有私營業主的共同困境，開業之後他們並需面對「非國有」之鄉鎮企業的競爭、以及無所不在的政治壓力；而在計畫體制漸進至市場改革的發展策略下，統制經濟多如牛毛的規定不可能一夕廢止，法規運用憑乎官員一心。 在此種環境下脫穎而出的唯一方法，依本文之見非關係莫屬：沒有關係時，私有企業經營者首先便要面臨如何憑空變出生產要素的問題，當貨物產出時，便要面對其他有硬預算壓力、資本亦較之雄厚的鄉鎮企業對手競爭，而在結構限制下，還要小心受意識型態影響之中共官員打擊；反之「私營」企業主們則可擁有生產要素，甚而直接併入競爭對手(鄉鎮企業)，也不用擔心官員的打壓。 為了要檢驗推論，本文第四章第三節對私營企業主的背景資料進行調查，企圖釐清幾件事： 第一、 既然私營企業主要與中共官方有關係才能發展，那麼領先群倫的中共富豪應該要有相當比例佔據黨政職位，才能證明本文的推論為真； 第二、 以西方經驗看來，現代化引起了階級及所有新生集體的意識，並產生政治覺悟，因此推派代理人爭取政治權利。過去中國大陸的歷史經驗已經看出資產階級政治權利與日俱進的趨勢，相對於此則是中共過去堅持的意識型態步步退縮。那麼該階級是否出現了夠份量的代表？如否，我們便能推論出，關係在此發揮了隱身幕後的效果。 為此，本文調查了「中國富豪榜前一百名之私營企業主」背景、具有企業主背景的中共候補中央委員及中華全國工商業聯合會第一到第十屆領導階層背景資料。本文發現，由富比士雜誌選出的2002年前一百名中國大陸富豪中，找不到官方背景或聯繫者只有七人。可知中國大陸的百大富豪中，百分之九十以上都與中共官方有關係。 而在第二個推論上，本文羅列經改以來中共促進私營經濟發展的重要論述內容，發現私營企業的地位與利益在中共過去最重視的意識型態領域與憲法層次中逐步彰顯，那麼是否其代表佔有顯要的政治地位呢？在中共中央候補委員的企業代表及中華全國工商業聯合會第一到第十屆領導階層背景資料中可以看出，私營企業主在中共的黨內地位並無提高趨勢，那麼究竟是什麼力量促成私營企業主的節節勝利？本文認為目前所有的證據都指向關係發揮了作用，才使得私營企業主們得以在沒有檯面代表的前提下，默默推動其政治利益提昇。而這種關係的建構必須是在改革前就已奠下基礎，到了改革後充分發揮，才能同時達到如此隱匿又豐碩的成果。因此我們可以下一個結論：1979年後產生的私營企業主們與中共官方根本是系出同源，而非兩個不同群體，所以才能在代表不顯的情形下，逐步使得中共放鬆其過去宣稱關鍵的意識型態領域，而私營企業主也很自然的配合了中共的統治。故從利益角度看來，關係的確順利的融合了中共及私營企業主。
並列摘要
This thesis argues that the government of the People Republic of China (PRC) controls the owners of private enterprises through guanxi. In the past, there were two explanations of the interaction between the PRC government and the bourgeoisie class. One was the “democracy" doctrine, which was influenced by the modernization paradigm. The other was the “regime stability” doctrine, which is based upon the PRC’s recent political development. The former argues that the PRC authority and the bourgeoisie compete against each other for power. According to this presupposition, the bourgeoisie class is growing under capitalism, thus, the bourgeoisie will either usurp the regime power now or will overthrow the PRC regime in the near future. The latter focuses on the regime’s flexible control and argues that the Communist Party of China (CPC) can keep control of their authoritarian regime rule. Scholars have debated the above arguments, and conducted surveys to prove the validity of their claims. However, both arguments contain the same basic hypothesis: the PRC government and the bourgeoisie are two distinct entities. As they cooperate and compete with each other, their subsequent power grows and declines. The reason for their conflict lies in the fact they are two opposing and separate groups. It would be simple for us to assume this is the only reason for the conflict between the PRC government and the bourgeoisie. However, if in fact the PRC authority and bourgeoisie are actually the same group, this would greatly undermine this hypothesis. Therefore, this paper has another hypothesis: the newborn bourgeoisie in mainland China emerged from the CPC. The reasoning for this hypothesis is that the CPC has taken a different path from the fate of pre-socialism countries in East European since 1988. In comparison to many “the third way” examples, the newly emerging bourgeoisie class in mainland China are relatively subdued, in that we can not see any organized potential opposition to the authoritarian regime. Many scholars comment that the CPC’s control is comprehensive and efficient; however, these scholars have yet to answer a simple question: most authoritarian regimes, which used similar control skills, could not resist the pressure of capitalism, but how has the CPC government been able to keep its rule until now? A possible explanation is that because the newborn bourgeoisie class in mainland China actually is born of the CPC, the relationship between newborn bourgeoisie and the CPC government works in cooperation rather than through control and confrontation. This thesis uses “guanxi” to answer the question of how the CPC government has been able to retain control. Chapter two discusses the context of guanxi, and then chapter three will point out how mainland China’s political and economic environment has made guanxi, an important institution of resource exchange. In this political and economic environment, the CPC government purged everything related to capitalism, including the bourgeoisie, through political movements and planned economy. Although the CPC government discarded the traditional system based upon families and land relation, the CPC then restructured the relationship between people in a new way to distribute resources, guanxi was this new way. After 1978, the economic reform started and state power withdrew from society. A new way in which to distribute resources emerged: the market. Through the capitalist market system, people believed the bourgeoisie could eventually compete with the authoritarian regime. However, the market has not developed in the PRC the way that some scholars had imagined. Two important questions to answer are: how did a regular person start an enterprise in the early reform years? And how did the private enterprise owners deal with competition and political pressure? Any economic textbook will explain that land, labor and capital are the basis of production. However, according to the PRC official data, most average individuals in mainland China lacked all three in the early 1980’s. Where did the necessary production resources come from? In addition, after building enterprises, the owners would compete with other “non state-own enterprises” which included township and village enterprises (TVEs) and always were under the political pressure. The best way private enterprise owners to succeed in this environment, according to this thesis, is through the use of guanxi: by guanxi, private enterprise owners made friends with officials and thus could obtain loans, land and labor. They were able to compete against TVEs, who even bought those TVEs by local government help without capital. All problems could be readily solved through guanxi. In order to exam these inference, chapter three and four cite the first hand data, which was conducted by PRC officials and scholars to demonstrate the lack of these three elements, the competence of TVEs, and the pressure of political movements. At the same time, we also investigate the background of some important private enterprise owners to examine the following hypotheses: Firstly, if the bourgeoisie must cooperate with the CPC, in order to run their enterprises smoothly, then we should see that the bourgeois occupy offices in the regime. Secondly, if the bourgeois did not occupy the CPC core then, according to the modernization paradigm, we should see all social classes (including the bourgeoisie) within a country shape their own consensus, and in turn support the delegates who fight for their political rights. On the contrary, if there are not the bourgeoisie delegates within the CPC core but the political rights for the bourgeoisie are still growing, we can infer that there may be some unofficial bourgeoisie delegates within the CPC core. The reason is that the CPC ideology, which is socialism, absolutely refutes capitalism, the ideology of the bourgeois. In order to retain its legitimacy, the CPC should have limited the bourgeoisie’s political rights, even if the CPC still approves of the bourgeoisie running their enterprises. However, the fact is that the political rights for the bourgeoisie are also growing; that is, the CPC ideology is declining. How can the bourgeoisie improve their position if there are no delegates within the CPC core to support them? The existence of guanxi is the only possible answer. Therefore, this thesis investigates the background of the 100 richest Chinese chosen in 2002 by Forbes Magazine, the CPC alternate members who also represent private enterprises, and the leadership of the All-China Federation of Industry & Commerce (ACFIC) from first to tenth term. First of all, among the 100 richest Chinese, we find only seven individuals on the list who do not have a connection to the CPC. In other words, over 90% of the richest Chinese are connected to the CPC regime. Next, this thesis lists the most important PRC official statements regarding the improvement and development of private enterprises. From those statements, the growing trend towards the bourgeoisie interests in context of the CPC ideology and the PRC Constitution is evident. So do the bourgeoisie delegates occupy positions in the CPC core? From the backgrounds of the CPC alternate members who also represent enterprises, and the leadership of ACFIC, we find that private owners do not occupy the top leadership position in ACFIC, which is called a “bridge” between the CPC and owners. Furthermore, the organization’s political influence has not increased within the CPC. Therefore, how could the bourgeoisie improve their political rights? All evidence points to the influence of guanxi, because through guanxi, the bourgeoisie could quietly push their rights rather than fighting to elect favorable political delegates. The conclusion is that the origin of the PRC and its bourgeoisie class are the same thing instead of two distinct groups. This is why the CPC is able to incrementally move away from its original ideology, because their control is safe from the bourgeoisie competition. Therefore, CPC cooperates with the bourgeoisie through the use of guanxi in the PRC.