不對稱資訊下雙產品獨占廠商最適定價機制選擇:序列定價與組合定價

The Optimal Design of Transaction-Based Discriminatory Mechanism: Sequential Schemes versus Optimal Bundling

吳惠婷(Hui-Ting Wu)

指導教授 ： 周善瑜

共同指導教授 ： 陳其美(Chyi-Mei Chen)

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/商學研究所/碩士(2011年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2011.02604

摘要

科技的進展使得廠商可藉由消費者行為資訊進行差別取價，以提升獲利；目前已有許多文獻針對行為差別取價策略進行討論，但大多利用線性訂價的方式，或僅考量單一產品。因此本文嘗試探討當一生產兩種產品(A產品與B產品)之獨占廠商，面對考量當期交易決策將如何影響未來交易條件之「策略性消費者」時，獨占廠商是否可藉由設計A、B兩種產品的序列交易機制，利用前期消費者行為資訊，於後期提升對消費者類型的認知以進行行為差別取價來提升總獲利；並探討消費者結構對廠商最適訂價策略的影響。本文假設消費者可先依據對A、B產品的需求強度分為對A、B產品需求強度皆低之低端消費者、對A產品需求強度低但對B產品需求強度高之中端消費者，以及對A、B產品的需求強度皆高的高端消費者，此三類消費者又皆有同一比例為策略性購買者，其餘則為短視近利購買者。本文以賽局分析的方法，假定廠商在對上述六型消費者資訊不完全下，以非線性訂價篩選消費者，獲致以下結果:
一、 當市場上全為理性消費者時，消費者的策略性回應使得廠商無法藉由行為差別取價來提高獲利，廠商宜採產品組合交易機制。
二、 當低端和中端消費者對A產品的需求強度夠高時，隨著低端消費者比例越高，序列交易機制相較於產品組合機制越可能成為廠商的最適策略。因為此時市場結構以對A、B產品需求強度為正相關的消費者為主，使得廠商可利用序列交易機制而有效推論消費者對另一種產品的需求強度，並可利用差別取價的機會而提高獲利。
三、 廠商的最適序列交易機制設計為:第一期的合約設計必須能夠使短視近利高端消費者與理性高端消費者在自我選擇後，被區隔在不同的消費者分群。
四、 當市場上全為短視近利消費者時，先販售B產品的序列交易機制(以下簡稱序列B)，不似產品組合，可使廠商藉由販售B產品的資訊，獲得可針對A產品進行差別取價的機會，因此當販售A產品階段可對低端和高端消費者差別取價的利益大於犧牲中端消費者時，序列B凌駕產品組合機制；而相較於序列A，當低端與中端消費者對A產品的需求強度夠大、高端相對於低、中端消費者的需求強度差距夠大且低端消費者的比例夠高，使得序列B可利用對A產品進行差別取價的優勢，來彌補其在B產品部分對高端和低端消費者的價格劣勢時，廠商宜採用序列B。先販售A產品的序列交易機制(以下簡稱序列A)可使廠商藉由販售A產品的資訊，在B產品販售階段獲得可對高端消費者進行一級差別取價、並對中低端消費者進行二級差別取價的機會，因此當低端與中端消費者對A產品的需求強度不大、高端消費者對A產品的需求強度夠高且低端與高端消費者皆有一定比例，使得序列A在高端與低端消費者的B產品價格優勢，能彌補在第一階段為了獲得資訊而無法販售A產品給低端消費者的利潤損失時，廠商宜採用序列A。

關鍵字

行為差別取價 ； 動態定價 ； 個人化行銷 ； 網路行銷

並列摘要

The rapid development of technology increases the availability of customer-revealed information, which also makes the practice of “behavior-based price discrimination” even more feasible. In this paper, we investigate under what circumstances should a monopoly firm selling two products (A and B) sell one product first in order to acquire customer information and then inplement optimal screening based on that information while selling the other product, and when such a sequential transaction scheme is preferred, which product should be offerred to customers first. In our model customers are privately informed about their valuations for the two products, which are known to the monopolistic firm to be positively correlated. In addition to the differences among consumers’ valuation set of the two products, whether the consumer will behave strategically during his decision process is taken into account as well. We then examine the influences on the monopoly firm’s optimal selling scheme and pricing strategy when it’s faced with both rational and myopic consumers.
Our study assumes that fully customers can be classified into three categories according to their valuations for the two products: the highs have high demand intensities for both products, the mediums have a low demand intensity for product A but a high demand intensity for product B, and the lows have low demand intensities for both products. The results are shown in the following: (1) Bundling transaction scheme would be the best selling mechanism when all consumers are rational. (2) When the low-ends as well as mediums ‘s valuation of product A is high enough, the higher the proportion of the low-ends, the more likely Sequential pricing out wins bundle pricing. The prior information helps to retrieve consumer preference to the other product and thus increase the firm’s profits. (3) The optimal design for the sequential transaction scheme involves that the prior-stage contract design should be able to allow the firm to separate the ration high-ends and myopic high-ends into different groups at the latter stage. (4) Suppose that consumers are all myopic. Under sequential pricing, selling product A (respectively, product B)first gives the firm the advantage to price discriminate against consumers with high valuations of product B(respectively, product A). As a result, to see which selling order is preferred depends on whether the latter profit gains would outweigh the profit sacrifice in the prior stage.

並列關鍵字

behavior-based price discrimination ； dynamic pricing ； individual marketing ； Internet marketing

參考文獻

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