私募資金與公司治理

PIPE and Corporate Governance

許景嵎(Ching-Yu Hsu)

指導教授 ： 陳聖賢

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/財務金融學研究所/博士(2016年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201600140

摘要

當公司利用私募方式來融資時，獨立董事能有效地降低代理成本與資訊不對稱的問題。本篇文章發現當獨立董事比例增加時，會給予投資人較少的折價，獨立董事也會讓公司比較不願意將股票賣給避險基金投資人。此外公司有較好的董事獨立性，會有較好的短期宣告效果，並且能改善長期較差的公司股票與績效報酬。

關鍵字

私募資金 ； 公司治理 ； 代理理論 ； 資訊不對稱

並列摘要

Independent directors can effectively reduce agency costs and information asymmetry when firms issue private investments in public equity (PIPEs). This paper uses hand-collected corporate governance data. Our empirical results show that the increase in board independence leads issuers to provide investors with less price discounts. The board independence also discourages issuers to place more shares to hedge fund investors. PIPE issuers perform a positive relation between board independence and initial announcement returns. Moreover, greater board independence mitigates poor post-issue stock and operating performance.

並列關鍵字

Private investment in public equity ； Corporate governance ； Agency theory ； Asymmetric information

參考文獻

Lie, E., 2005. Operating performance following open market share repurchase announcements. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39, 411-436.

Adams, R., Ferreira, D., 2007. A theory of friendly boards. Journal of Finance, 217-50.

Armstrong, C., Guay, W., Weber, J., 2010. The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and contracting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50, 179-234.

Barber, B., Lyon, J., 1997. Detecting long-run abnormal stock returns: the empirical power and specification of test statistics. Journal of Financial Economics 43, 341-372.

Barclay, M., Holderness, C., Sheehan, D., 2007. Private placements and managerial entrenchment. Journal of Corporate Finance 13, 461-484.